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ABSTRACT 
Framed within a discussion of populism, this thesis provides a critical analysis of the 
campaign and short tenure in office of Ecuadorian President Lucio Gutiérrez Borbúa.  It outlines 
a multi-dimensional approach to populism that is characterized by five components: (1) 
personalistic leadership, (2) a heterogeneous coalition of support, (3) top-down political 
mobilization, (4) an ambiguous ideological discourse, and (5) a redistributive and clientelistic 
economic approach.  Applied to the Gutiérrez case, the multi-dimensional approach highlights 
the viability and volatility of populism.   
This thesis argues that Gutiérrez ascended to the presidency through the successful 
application of a populist strategy, which generated significant expectations among the public and 
his political allies.  Yet, once in office, Gutiérrez’ populist strategy was unable to sustain the 
support he enjoyed during the campaign.  The expectations he generated went unmet as he 
engaged in clear reversals of the “populist imaginary” created by his candidacy.  His twenty-
eight months in office were characterized by neoliberalism, corruption, and status quo political 
machinations that had sunk his predecessors.  Tracking Gutiérrez’ transition from populist 
champion to political pariah using the multi-dimensional approach indicates that although 
populism can be an effective electoral strategy, it can also impose significant limitations on a 
government.  Ultimately, the Gutiérrez case reinforces the important role played by the “populist 
imaginary” in determining the success or failure of populist leaders.  
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CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION 
On 20 April 2005, growing public unrest in Ecuador reached a climax following a series 
of political missteps by the country’s once popular President Lucio Gutiérrez Borbúa.  
Thousands of students, union members, and indigenous groups descended on Quito, the 
Ecuadorian capital, to demand the President’s resignation.  This was followed, one day later, by 
another demonstration, this time by throngs of Quito’s citizens who converged on the 
presidential palace to voice their opposition to the president.  Demonstrations against Gutiérrez 
had recently gained widespread national support after he removed the Supreme Court justices, 
imposed a state of emergency, and harangued the protestors by labeling them forajidos, or 
criminals.  Amidst the unfolding chaos, Gutiérrez fled by helicopter from the roof of the 
presidential palace, the crowds surged against the barricades below, his Congressional opponents 
voted to remove him from office, and the military rescinded its support. 
This political turmoil, institutional breakdown, and demonstration of public anger 
directed at the President came only twenty-eight months after Gutiérrez’ rise to the nation’s 
highest office at the head of a vibrant populist movement.  During the presidential campaign, his 
unexpected success, sudden popularity, and unique coalition with the country’s powerful 
indigenous movement appeared to signal a watershed political moment for Ecuador.  Why did 
such a reversal of fortunes take place and what type of critical analysis could help to explain the 
President’s meteoric rise and fall from power?  Motivated by these questions, this thesis argues 
that Lucio Gutiérrez ascended to the presidency through the successful and skillful application of 
a populist strategy that generated significant expectations among the public and his political 
allies.  However, once in office, Gutiérrez’ populist strategy was unable to sustain the support he 
enjoyed during the campaign and the expectations he generated went unmet causing significant 
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opposition to his hold on power.  Framed within a discussion of populism and its component 
parts, this thesis analyzes the Ecuadorian experience through a case study of Lucio Gutiérrez’ 
campaign and presidency.  Examining the viability and volatility of populism in Ecuador 
supports a more nuanced understanding of the populist phenomenon in contemporary Latin 
American. 
This study of populism and Lucio Gutiérrez evolved, in part, out of my brief field 
experience in Ecuador in late 2004 in the weeks following the president’s political maneuvering 
against the Supreme Court.  At this time, there was an obvious tension between the president’s 
message and actions and the public sentiment.  A contradiction that was readily apparent in the 
government’s self-aggrandizing signs that declared “Lucio Construye” (Lucio Builds) and the 
simmering public anger demonstrated by the many ready-to-burn effigies of Gutiérrez visible 
throughout the capital.  This case necessitated further review given my firsthand experience and 
the volatile events of the President’s ouster only a few months later.  Furthermore, Ecuador’s 
recent history, in particular the preceding decade (1995 to 2005) that saw seven different 
presidents take office, called for additional analysis of one of Latin America’s relatively 
unexamined countries. 
Research Methodology 
This thesis employs a qualitative research approach in order to assemble a comprehensive 
set of data from various sources.  Primary sources for research include Ecuadorians’ first hand 
accounts, polling data, statistics, speeches, radio transcripts, government publications, and local 
and international media coverage of unfolding events gathered during a period of field research.  
Research journals, books, articles by non-governmental organizations, and reports by 
international agencies proved to be reliable secondary sources.  The case study in Chapter Three 
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is structured chronologically and relies on media coverage to place events in sequence.  
Additionally, various primary sources are employed in this section to add depth to the discussion.  
Where possible local, Spanish language resources were used. 
During the course of this project what became obvious was the lack of scholarly work 
specifically exploring Lucio Gutiérrez’ brand of populism.  While this presented a challenge in 
terms of the writing of this thesis, it has highlighted the value of additional work in this area.  
Organization  
In order to explore the issue of populism in Ecuador, this thesis is organized into five 
chapters: Chapter One – Introduction, Chapter Two – Understanding Populism, Chapter Three – 
Lucio Gutiérrez’ Rise to Power, Chapter Four – Lucio Gutiérrez’ Downfall, and Chapter Five – 
Conclusion.   
Chapter One addresses the goals, framework, and methodology of the thesis.  In Chapter 
Two the theoretical framework of the thesis is presented.  It constitutes a survey of the various 
perspectives on populism and examines its contested nature.  To overcome the lack of clarity 
about the concept, this chapter outlines a multi-dimensional approach to populism by suggesting 
that there are five key components.  As well, Chapter Two reviews populism’s relationship to 
neoliberalism, which is the prevailing socio-economic context of Lucio Gutiérrez’ Ecuador.  This 
provides the context for the evaluation that follows in the next two chapters on the campaign and 
presidency of Lucio Gutiérrez.  In Chapter Three, Gutiérrez’ campaign for the presidency is 
surveyed showing that his actions are consistent with the components of the multi-dimensional 
approach to populism.  Chapter Four highlights the expectations generated by Gutiérrez’ 
successful use of a populist strategy during his presidential campaign and his subsequent failure 
to meet those expectations through his actual policies and practices once in office.  Finally, 
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Chapter Five provides an overview of the major findings, offers concluding observations 
regarding populism and the Ecuadorian case, and suggests avenues for further study. 
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CHAPTER TWO – UNDERSTANDING POPULISM  
“…few social science concepts can match populism when it comes to nebulous and 
inconsistent usage…”1 
 
Populism is a particularly difficult social science concept to understand given its 
application to such a wide variety of divergent political phenomena and socio-economic 
contexts.  A workable definition of populism or even a common set of constitutive elements are 
contested within the academic discourse and, as such, have raised questions about populism’s 
analytical potential.2  Despite the lack of a widely agreed upon definition, this paper builds on 
the work of proponents of the concept’s analytical potential to assert that populism is a useful 
concept for an examination of Ecuadorian politics.  The goal of this chapter is to provide a brief 
review of populism’s contested nature and to discuss the various perspectives that have been 
offered.  This will be followed by an attempt to re-articulate the concept as a multidimensional 
phenomenon, that is, one capable of unifying the various perspectives.  
In addition to these goals, this chapter surveys populism’s (in)compatibility with the 
prevailing political and socio-economic context of neoliberalism.  Neoliberalism – the 
orientation toward open markets, a circumscribed role of government in the economy, budget 
austerity, and privatization – provides the contextual undercurrent for Gutiérrez’ populist 
activities in Ecuador.  The sometimes complementary and sometimes conflicting relationship 
between populism and neoliberalism will be examined in order to provide insight into President 
Gutiérrez’ rise to power and subsequent downfall that is examined in Chapter Three.  
                                                
1 Kenneth M. Roberts, "Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism in Latin America: The Peruvian Case," 
World Politics 48.1 (1995): 84.  
2 See Paul Drake, “Requiem for Populism,” in Latin American Populism in Comparative Perspective, ed. Michael L. 
Conniff (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1982), 217 – 245. 
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A Contested Concept 
 Populism is a murky concept, mired in ill-defined and often conflicting usage.  As 
Canovan states, “although frequently used by historians, social scientists, and political 
commentators, the term is exceptionally vague and refers in different contexts to a bewildering 
variety of phenomena.”3  Moreover, the term populism in a Latin American context usually 
carries a negative connotation: “For most it implies an abnormality, an anomaly, and a passing 
phenomenon that will eventually, and hopefully, go away.”4  The term has been applied to a vast 
spectrum of Latin American (and other) leaders from authoritarians (Carlos Ibáñez del Campo in 
Chile), to socialists (Fidel Castro in Cuba), to progressive reformers (Victor Raúl Haya de la 
Torre in Peru).5  Not surprisingly, there is widespread confusion over its meaning.   
The difficulty of defining populism relates to the concept’s relatively recent emergence in 
the mid-twentieth century as an area of analysis within the social sciences.6   In fact, prior to the 
1960s, very few academic works utilized the term and even fewer political actors willingly 
ascribed to the label.  Therefore, populism has not achieved widespread agreement on its 
conceptualization: “for many years political scientists have struggled to provide a meaningful 
and precise definition.”7  The conceptual vagary surrounding the meaning of the term and its the 
contested use highlight the need for a more rigorous understanding that can move populism 
beyond a derogatory adjective.8 
                                                
3 Margaret Canovan, Populism, (New York: Harcourt, 1981), 3. 
4 Carlos de la Torre, Populist Seduction in Latin America: The Ecuadorian Experience (Athens: Ohio University 
Press, 2000), ix. 
5 For an examination of the spectrum of Latin American populist leaders, see Robert H. Dix, “Populism: 
Authoritarian and Democratic,” Latin American Research Review 20 (1985): 29-52. 
6 Michael L. Conniff, Latin American Populism in Comparative Perspective, (Albuquerque: University of New 
Mexico Press, 1982), 23. 
7 Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards, The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America, (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1991), 8. 
8 Salo V. Coslovsky, “Neoliberalism, Populism and Presidential Impeachment in Latin America” (M.A. thesis, Tufts 
University, 2002), 18. 
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 In part, the contention surrounding the definitional issue results from the broad, and 
arguably erroneous, categorization of the phenomenon into classical populism and neopopulism.  
Both categories will be examined in greater detail in the latter part of this chapter.  However, 
classic populism is generally associated with the rise, especially in Latin America, of mass 
politics and state-sponsored income redistribution in the early twentieth century.  While 
neoliberal populism, also called neopopulism, is typically associated with populist mobilizations 
undertaken in concert with neoliberal reforms from the 1980s to the present.  Classical and 
neopopulist categorizations provide a basic means for grouping and differentiating among 
populist manifestations, but their exact characteristics and time periods are a matter of debate 
and depend greatly on the academic perspective employed.  As is detailed later in this chapter, 
classical populism and neopopulism will be shown to be merely subtypes of an overarching 
populist phenomenon and not as inherently unique manifestations.      
The lack of a concise definition of populism also stems from the difficultly of situating 
populism neatly within any one academic discourse or from a single widely accepted 
perspective.  Scholars have examined Latin American populism from: (1) the 
historical/sociological; (2) the ideological/discursive; (3) the economic; or (4) the political 
perspective.9  Overall, these four perspectives on populism produce an array of possible 
attributes that makeup populism, which makes comparative analysis difficult and reduces the 
utility of the concept.  
First, the historical/sociological perspective explains populism as a transitional 
occurrence that is contingent on a society’s linear evolution from a ‘traditional’ to a ‘modern’ 
                                                
9 Roberts, "Peruvian Case," 84; Kurt Weyland, “Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin 
American Politics,” Comparative Politics 34.1 (2001): 2.  
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state.10  This perspective situates populism within a specific historical and socioeconomic stage 
of development and typically relies on modernization and dependency theories.  The so-called 
era of classical populism, roughly spanning the period of the 1930s to the 1960s, was often 
analyzed from the historical/sociological perspective as the period’s populists were a reflection 
of, and motivated by, socioeconomic transitions underway at the time (i.e. urbanization, 
industrialization, and economic recession).  Populism was thus assumed to be a temporary 
phenomenon that comprised various political strategies for dealing with these changes.  
However, the historical/sociological perspective is largely discredited as populism has endured 
beyond a specific time period and has adapted to a wide range of social, economic, and political 
conditions.   
Second, the ideological/discursive perspective defines populism through its rhetorical 
undercurrent and mode of articulation.  This perspective centers analysis on the contents of the 
populist appeal, which is typically based on an anti-status quo message intended to highlight the 
struggle between the ‘people’ and the ‘power bloc’.11  Ernesto Laclau outlines the role of 
populist discourse in defining populism both by what is said (typically an appeal to the people) 
and by how it is articulated to produce a populist mode of representation.12  Specifically, Laclau 
explains that “populism consists in the representation of popular-democratic interpellations as a 
synthetic antagonistic complex with respect to the dominant ideology.”13  More simply, populism 
expresses the will of the people against those in power.  One of the potential difficulties of 
defining populism from the ideology/discursive perspective, however, is that the boundaries of 
                                                
10 Roberts, "Peruvian Case," 85; Coslovsky, 16. 
11 Yannis Stavrakakis, “Antinomies of formalism: Laclau’s theory of populism and the lessons from religious 
populism in Greece,” Journal of Political Ideologies 9.3 (October 2004): 256-257.  
12 Ernesto Laclau, “Populism: What’s in a Name?,” in Populism and the Mirror of Democracy, ed. Francisco 
Panizza (London: Verso, 2005), 33-4.  
13 Ernesto Laclau, “Towards a theory of populism,” in Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory, ed. E. Laclau 
(London: New Left Books, 1977), 143, quoted in Yannis Stavrakakis, “Religion and Populism in Contemporary 
Greece,” in Populism and the Mirror of Democracy, ed. Francisco Panizza (London: Verso, 2005), 231. 
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the concept can be so general as to apply to a wide variation of policies and actions framed 
within a popular rhetoric.   
Third, the economic perspective establishes populism as a set of popular economic 
policies used to achieve political ends.  Typically these economic policies include the use of 
macroeconomic measures for the creation and maintenance of popular support within multi-class 
coalitions of urban workers and the middle class.  Popular policies such as wealth redistribution 
and food and fuel subsidization have often proven to be ill-conceived and unsustainable in the 
long-term.  The economic perspective features prominently in many interpretations of Latin 
America’s classical populism era, in which politicians relied heavily on these economically 
redistributive and statist strategies to gain and secure power.  However, the economic perspective 
on populism has been faulted for its tendency to bind populism to specific development models, 
especially import substitution industrialization, and to reduce populism to mere economic policy, 
ignoring the importance of populist organizational strategies and relations with supporters.14  
Moreover, from the narrow economic perspective it is difficult to determine if populism’s much 
maligned economic irresponsibility is “due to design or mere constraint.”15   
Fourth, the political perspective defines populism in terms of political strategy, 
specifically how populists compete for and exercise political power.16  Prominent in analyses of 
the neopopulist era of the post-1980s, the political perspective on populism emphasizes the 
relationship dynamics between the leader and supporters.  As well, it focuses on the political 
methods utilized by populists to translate this relationship into political power.  From this 
perspective, populism is characterized by the deinstitutionalization of political representation, 
such as through the rejection of political parties, to achieve unmediated relations between the 
                                                
14 Roberts, "Peruvian Case," 86. 
15 Weyland, “Clarifying,” 11. 
16 Weyland, “Clarifying,” 11. 
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leader and supporters.  Additionally, the political perspective underscores the importance of 
personalistic leadership styles, which can facilitate the creation of mass, multiclass, electoral 
coalitions.17  While this perspective is useful in unhinging populism from particular economic 
development models or ideological discourses, it can be faulted for overemphasizing the role of 
political strategy and tactics to the exclusion of important concerns such as the economy and 
society. 
A Multidimensional Perspective on Populism  
When separately employed, these perspectives are less useful for analysis as each 
disregards important considerations.  For this reason, many scholars (including Roberts, Conniff, 
Knight, and de la Torre)18 choose to employ a multidimensional perspective that utilizes 
elements from each of these perspectives and categorizes different populist experiences based on 
their adherence to core attributes.  As Canovan asserts:  
the range and variety of movements lumped together under the general heading of 
populism make it clear that what we need is not a single essentialist definition, but rather 
a typology of populisms – one moreover, which is capable of accommodating a wide 
range of different phenomena seen from different analytical viewpoints.19 
This thesis will draw on just such an understanding of populism to examine Ecuador’s 
experiences under President Gutiérrez in Chapter Three. 
 In particular, this thesis borrows from the work of Kenneth Roberts, who presents a 
particularly clear and useful conceptualization of populism.  He employs a multidimensional 
perspective that contains five core attributes: (1) a personalistic mode of leadership, (2) a 
heterogeneous political coalition based in the subaltern sectors, (3) a top-down political 
                                                
17 Roberts, "Peruvian Case," 87; Weyland, “Clarifying,” 14. 
18 See Roberts, "Peruvian Case;" Conniff, Latin American Populism; Alan Knight, “Populism and Neo-populism in 
Latin America, Especially Mexico,” Journal of Latin American Studies 30 (1998); and de la Torre, “Populist 
Seduction.” 
19 Canovan, 12-3. 
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mobilization, (4) an eclectic, anti-establishment ideology, and (5) an economically redistributive 
or clientelistic approach.20  He defends this perspective on populism, which he terms a “synthetic 
construction,”21 as the best means of understanding the term’s complexity and adaptive 
properties that are less apparent through the four isolated approaches outlined previously.  By 
clearly defining the five core characteristics of populism, the multidimensional approach also 
allows for the possibility of various populist sub-types that empirically reflect only some of the 
attributes.  Within the Ecuadorian context, the multidimensional definition is particularly helpful; 
its breadth allows for the incorporation of the broad spectrum of prevailing elements and thus 
better captures the nuance and complexity of the Ecuadorian case.  Moreover, this understanding 
of populism allows the concept to be less restricted by a particular time period or economic 
model, allowing for a continuity of analysis from the so-called classical populist to the 
neopopulist manifestations.   
Components of the Multidimensional Perspective 
The first element of the multidimensional perspective on populism focuses on leadership 
style and strategy.  Typically, the populist employs a personalistic, paternalistic, and, 
occasionally, charismatic method of leadership.22  He/she uses personal attributes, history, and 
actions to create an appeal to supporters that is based on implied strengths, unique qualifications, 
and/or popular image.  For example, Peruvian populist President Alberto Fujimori, capitalized on 
his Japanese heritage, lack of connection to the Creole political elite, and humble origins to 
establish a personal connection with average Peruvians.23 As part of their personalistic appeal, 
populist leaders take a paternalistic approach to supporters creating the illusion that they are 
                                                
20 Roberts, “Peruvian Case,” 88. 
21 Roberts, “Peruvian Case,” 88. 
22 Roberts, “Peruvian Case,” 88. 
23 Roberts, “Peruvian Case,” 94-5. 
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protectors of the public’s best interest.  However, populist paternalism tends to be a means for 
leaders to interpret and act on the popular will in a manner that best suites their political 
ambitions.  Charisma, often confused with populism in mainstream discourse, can also be a 
definitive element of populist leadership.  An engaging and appealing persona reinforces the 
populist’s leadership by creating a symbolic cult of personality and strengthening the bond 
between the leader and followers.24  The existence of charismatic leadership focuses politics on 
the character and image of the leader rather than definitive, tangible issues. 
The second component of the multidimensional perspective refers to the populist’s base 
of support, which is typically a heterogeneous, multiclass political coalition concentrated within 
the subaltern25 sectors of society.26  Instead of receiving support solely from elite power brokers 
or political parties, populists rely on the support of a mass-based political coalition.  This 
coalition can contain a plethora of atomized individuals and organized groups that represent 
various interests, socioeconomic classes, ethnicities, and regional affiliations (such as urban and 
rural, highland and costal).  For instance, Abdala Bucaram, Ecuador’s short-lived President of 
the mid-1990s, allied with those who were marginalized and excluded from the centres of power: 
economic elites lacking social prestige, poor workers rebelling against their employer’s 
candidate, and displaced professionals and intellectuals.27  As this example highlights, populism 
characteristically finds support in broad coalitions of which the politically dispossessed and 
marginalized – the non-dominant, subaltern sectors – are a majority. 
                                                
24 Knight, “Populism and Neo-populism,” 231.  
25 The term subaltern  is employed as a more inclusive and less ideologically burdened terminology than lower class 
or working class and it reflects the increase in Latin America’s informal economy and decrease in the centrality of 
the labour movement.  Borrowed from Roberts, “Peruvian Case,” 89. 
26 Roberts, “Peruvian Case,” 88. 
27 Carlos De La Torre, “Neopopulism in Contemporary Ecuador: The Case of Bucaram’s Use of the Mass Media,” 
International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 12.4 (1999): 567. 
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The third element of the multidimensional perspective on populism is the distinctive 
political mobilization process that is directed from the top-down and either circumvents 
institutional forms of mediation or subordinates them to more direct linkages between the leader 
and supporters.28  Given populism’s use of personalistic leadership and mass coalitions, a 
hierarchical political mobilization is a natural fit as the leader embodies and interprets the 
popular will, claiming to give voice to the marginalized masses.  Political mobilization under 
populism relies on the direct, largely unmediated, relationship between the leader and supporters 
that removes the influence of intermediate institutions (such as legislatures, political parties, the 
media, or civil society groups) that can dilute the control of populist leaders over their 
supporters.  Moreover, populists can build strong, personal loyalties that motivate supporters to 
action at the ballot box, in the streets, or in confrontations with oppositional institutions by 
dominating, circumventing, or subordinating institutional forms of mediation.  Finally, populists 
gain or maintain support by utilizing executive powers to control and reorder the state through 
referenda, constituent assemblies, and appointments.  
The fourth facet of the multidimensional perspective shows that populism is 
characterized by an amorphous or eclectic ideology that is most often expressed through an anti-
elite and/or anti-establishment discourse praising subaltern sectors of society.29  In order to 
attract and motivate a broad coalition of support, populists tend to reject ideological 
classification on the left or right of the political spectrum and focus on politically popular ideals 
and policies.  Critical of the current status-quo, populists imbue their discourse with a strong 
anti-elite, anti-establishment message that is “propeople”30 aimed at drawing in new groups and 
                                                
28 Roberts, “Peruvian Case,” 88. 
29 Roberts, “Peruvian Case,” 88. 
30 Nicos Mouzelis, "On the Concept of Populism: Populist and Clientelist Modes of Incorporation in Semiperipheral 
Polities," Politics & Society 14.3 (1985): 344. 
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motivating divergent groups towards a common goal.  As well, populism’s oppositional 
discourse tends to align supporters against existing political forces (i.e. “the establishment”) and 
with a popular force (i.e. “the populist leader”) emerging outside and, thus, unbound by the 
political establishment.  For example, the 2006 election of President Rafael Correa in Ecuador 
relied on his “fresh-faced outsider” image, attacks on the Congress as a “sewer” of corruption, 
and his calls for constitutional reforms to benefit people over political parties.31    
Finally, the fifth component of the multidimensional perspective on populism is an 
economic approach that employs redistributive or clientelistic methods in order to create a 
material foundation for popular support.32  During electoral contests, populists mobilize 
supporters by relying heavily on promises of future economic benefits.  Take, for instance, the 
case of Álvaro Noboa, Ecuador’s richest man and perennial presidential candidate, who used his 
2002 campaign stops as spectacles of his largess, handing out wheelchairs to the disabled and 
loans to street vendors.33  Such actions, while an overt attempt to buy votes, created a popular 
image of Noboa’s potential presidency as one that would be economically beneficial to the 
marginalized.  Once in power, populists craft economic policies that ensure the maintenance and 
continual generation of popular support, especially among subaltern groups.34  The specific 
economic policies employed depend largely on the capacity of the state to use resources in a 
redistributive or clientelistic manner.  Thus, this characterization of economic populism can 
incorporate the macro-level redistribution policies, prominent in the era of classical populism, 
and the micro-level clientelism frequently employed in the neopopulist era in which neoliberal 
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policies have restricted the financial and redistributive capacity of the state.  While populism’s 
economic approach may seem to disparage the ability of voters to make rational choices, Roberts 
aptly notes that “in contexts of grinding poverty and urgent social needs, the poor can hardly be 
blamed for exchanging political loyalty for handouts from a paternalistic state.”35        
In sum, Roberts’ multidimensional approach provides a useful framework for 
understanding the nature of populism because it encapsulates the various academic perspectives 
within the five core characteristics.  As well, it offers a means for populist analysis to overcome 
the static and reductionist tendencies that are the main fault of the unidimensional perspectives 
on populism (i.e. sociological/historical, ideological/discursive, economic, and political 
perspectives).  Given populism’s complexity, this multidimensional approach is most effective 
for interpreting change and continuity in various populist experiences over time, thereby 
reducing the distinctions between classical populism and populism in the neoliberal era.36  The 
ability to traverse the various manifestations of populism that are otherwise separated by a strict 
focus on specific constitutive elements, such as socioeconomic conditions or economic 
development models, allows populism to remain a useful conceptual tool.  Ultimately, the 
multidimensional perspective provides a basic set of characteristic elements against which we 
can assess the actions of a politician to determine if he/she is a populist and, if so, evaluate 
his/her use of populism as a political strategy. 
Reconciling Neoliberalism and Populism 
The inclusiveness of the multidimensional approach counters the supposed disappearance 
of populism that was predicted in the wake of Latin America’s return to democratic government 
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and the rise of the neoliberal development model.37  Neoliberalism’s economic cannon, also 
known as the Washington Consensus, which calls for governments to adopt a free-market 
orientation, a reduced role in the allocation of state resources, fiscal austerity, and global 
economic integration appeared to create significant pressures and constraints for classical 
populism.38  On the surface, the tenets of neoliberalism appeared to be antithetical to Latin 
America’s populist experiences spanning from the 1930s to the 1970s, wherein populists relied 
on an interventionist, economically nationalist state that engaged in subsidization, price controls, 
and protections for industry in order to create and maintain mass popular support.  However, 
populism’s contemporary resurgence as a widely used political strategy, in concert with the 
pressures and limitations imposed on governments by the neoliberal development model, has 
created a “novel paradox.”39  In the following sections this novel paradox will be examined in 
terms of its areas of compatibility and incompatibility.    
Compatibilities Between Populism and Neoliberalism 
Consistent with the constituent elements of populism outlined above it is possible to 
identify certain “underlying affinities that make neoliberalism and contemporary populism 
coincide in important, inherent ways.”40  Weyland and Roberts identify three central areas of 
convergence between populism and neoliberalism: (1) an anti-organizational/anti-institutional 
inclination; (2) a tendency towards the concentration of power; and (3) a predilection for 
economic clientelism. 
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Shared Anti-Organizational, Anti-Institutional Inclination  
The first point of convergence between populism and neoliberalism is the tendency of 
each to eschew organizational and institutional mechanisms.  Ad hoc political movements or 
coalitions that lack a strong organizational and institutional bent typically characterize populism.  
For instance, Peru’s President Fujimori created a new “political party” for each of four electoral 
contests between 1990 and 2000 that lacked significant institutionalization and were ultimately 
fronts for highly personalistic political vehicles.41 In cases more closely associated with the era 
of classical populism, in which populists institutionalized political parties or organized coalitions 
with the labour movement (i.e. Argentina’s President Juan Perón, 1946-55, and his 
Justicialist/Peronist Party with strong ties to unions), these actions can be understood as a means 
to further the political aspirations and agenda of the leader.  Moreover, populism, as noted 
earlier, is characterized by the creation of direct, unmediated mobilizations of atomized followers 
by personalistic leaders, which inherently denies and limits a role for institutions and 
organizations.   
Weyland goes further in stating that during the era of neoliberalism populism has not just 
lacked organization and institutionalization, but is actually anti-organizational and encourages 
only low-level institutionalization.42  The rationale for such an assertion stems from the 
populist’s mobilization of support among the poor and marginalized who lack strong group 
loyalties and harbour significant distrust of public institutions, which they perceive as corrupt, 
illegitimate, and ineffective.43  In addition, populists tend to forgo or deemphasize the support of 
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existing organizations such as business groups and labour unions given their weakened position 
in the neoliberal context of growing informal employment, trade liberalization, increased foreign 
competition, and deregulation of labour markets.  Populism’s compatibility with neoliberalism is 
bolstered by the anti-organizational and anti-institutional orientation of neoliberalism that 
emphasizes protecting the market from special interests and rent-seeking groups.  Drawing a 
parallel between the unfettered market and the unorganized masses, Weyland observes that “the 
undifferentiated mass of the people following the leader is akin to the unstructured market.”44  
Populism and neoliberalism’s shared anti-institutional/anti-organizational bias is 
furthered by their shared anti-status quo discourse.  Like populism, neoliberalism shares a similar 
discourse, especially noticeable during the initial stages of the neoliberal transformation, that 
seeks to alter the status quo structure and organization of the economic and political space.  As 
Ellner observes, “the marginalized sectors of the population, having lost out as a result of long-
standing import substitution policies, were responsive to neopopulist discourse.”45  The failures 
of previous regimes to institute economic changes beneficial to the subaltern sectors have 
allowed for a convergence of populist mobilization and neoliberal reform in opposition to 
existing political actors and organizations.  Additionally, the relationships which once existed 
between social stratification and political orientation have changed to the point that class 
identities are no longer an accurate predictor of political behaviour.46  The traditional orientation 
of subaltern voters towards left-wing politics, for example, is a less reliable predictor of political 
behaviour given marginalization of the labour movement, increasing economic informality, and 
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growing atomization among voters.47  Thus, populist leaders have been able to capitalize on 
neoliberal demands for structural change that appeal to subaltern voters who are upset with 
current political and economic conditions.  The convergence of anti-institutional and anti-
organizational orientations in both populism and neoliberalism leads to the second affinity 
between the two: the tendency toward the concentration of power. 
Shared Tendency to Concentrate Power 
Another key area of convergence between populism and neoliberalism is their shared 
tendency toward a concentration of power that creates a surprisingly symbiotic relationship.48  
The inclination of populist leaders to concentrate power has its origin in their personalistic 
leadership style, which centers politics on the leader, and away from public policy changes 
promised to supporters during the electoral cycle.49  Popular and transformative measures are 
more easily achieved through the domination of weakened organizations, like the labour 
movement, and institutions like the judiciary, congress, and public service.   
Similarly, neoliberalism has been seen as reliant on concentrating power in strong, bold 
leaders to achieve the initial transformation of the economic and political space, despite 
opposition from entrenched interests.50  In Brazil for instance, President Collor de Mello’s 1989 
populist electoral victory achieved through “his denunciation of the political establishment and 
his direct appeal to the people, circumventing existing political parties,” allowed him to 
implement contentious reforms by presidential decree, including a freeze on financial assets.51  
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Likewise, President Carlos Menem of Argentina (1989-99) capitalized on the economic failures 
of his predecessor and the institutional crisis of the state to concentrate power in the executive.  
With a combination of popular support, union backing, congressional control, and a cooperative 
majority of state governors, Menem was able to temporarily promote urgent neoliberal reforms at 
any cost.52  Thus, populism and neoliberalism’s tendency to support the concentration of power 
provides populist leaders with compatible neoliberal approaches that “give their own power 
hunger a rational, modern justification.”53  
Shared Predilection For Clientelism 
The third point of convergence between populism and neoliberalism is their use of 
clientalistic mechanisms that provide targeted opportunities to reinforce popular support.  
Although neoliberalism is often thought to restrict populism’s traditional spending powers 
through budget austerity demands and market constraints, it also provides a limited means of 
reinforcing support through low-cost, direct, and highly visible programs and political 
opportunities.  The structural adjustment programs of key neoliberal institutions, like the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, have coincided with targeted initiatives by 
these institutions to address issues like poverty and inequality.  These initiatives typically focus 
on capacity building, local or rural development, social sector spending, and private sector job 
creation in order to mitigate some of the worst impacts of macro-economic structural adjustment.  
The provision of benefits through such programs can fulfill voters’ demands for material 
redistribution and are often received favorably because of their appearance as simple, direct 
solutions to societal and political problems.  For instance, under the guise of neoliberal 
technocratic public management reform, populist leaders are able to remove recalcitrant 
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members of the bureaucracy and reward political supporters with positions.  Ecuador’s President 
Abdalá Bucaram forsook ideology and party affiliation to gain the support of specific sectors by 
engaging in clientelism at the cabinet level.  His actions provided him with needed political 
capital and resulted in the unusual appointment of both feminists and ultraconservatives within 
the same cabinet.54  Additionally, targeted spending programs, can create clientelistic exchanges 
between the leader and specific sectors of society in much the same way as the macro-level 
economic redistribution policies used by classical populists.  The purpose of creating this 
clientelistic exchange is to show that the leader meets the needs of ‘the people’ while also 
strengthening his image.  This is supported by institutions like the IMF and the World Bank that, 
for example, are willing to fund targeted poverty relief programs.  Although clientelism may 
seem to conflict with populism and neoliberalism’s reluctance to give in to special interest 
groups, in this case the leader determines the client, service, and price to best benefit himself.  
For instance, using international contributions to support his social programs, President Fujimori 
directed poverty relief, food assistance, and school construction programs from the president’s 
office in order to garner votes among the atomized masses.55  In sum, neoliberal market reforms 
can provide beneficial options for populists to strengthen their leadership by successfully 
initiating clientelistic programs or political patronage appointments. 
The affinities between neoliberalism and populism help to explain the relative success 
enjoyed by the neoliberal era’s early populists, like Fujimori and Menem, within the context of 
sweeping economic adjustment and intense social disruption.  However, while these affinities 
provide evidence to support the use of populist politics to achieve and maintain power in spite of 
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and on occasion in concert with neoliberal policies, they also offer insight into the potential 
collapse of populist rule.56   
Incompatibilities Between Populism and Neoliberalism 
In principle, the synergy between populism and neoliberalism offers significant insight 
into the success of populists in the current era, but in practice there exist many variables and 
contextual elements which have the potential to limit or erode this compatibility and lead to the 
downfall of Latin America’s populists.  As Roberts notes, the combination of populist politics 
and neoliberal policies is not exempt from contradictions and over time will not necessarily be 
effective in creating widespread support for populists and their neoliberal reforms.57  The early 
years of neoliberal transformation, for instance, especially favoured cooperation among 
neoliberal advocates and populist politicians who both championed radical political and 
economic changes.  During electoral contests, populists could rail against the failures of previous 
governments, leaders, and political parties to stop inflation, stimulate growth, attract investment, 
and increase employment.  With this strategy, they were able to win significant popular support.  
At the same time, neoliberals could encourage bold structural adjustment schemes that promised 
to solve these problems and to promote growth, employment, and prosperity.  As a result, in 
implementing drastic neoliberal reforms populist leaders could initially claim they were 
preserving national sovereignty by enhancing their nation’s ability to deal with globalization and 
were bolstering democracy by representing the popular will for change.58   
However, over time the economic stresses and the social costs stemming from the 
neoliberal reforms generated opposition from large portions of the population that were 
adversely affected.  The restructuring often increased the price of basic goods, reduced social 
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spending in areas of education and health care, and created unemployment through privatization 
and increased international competition.59  Not surprisingly, the groups most affected by these 
policies were among the subaltern sectors, the key political constituency of mass support for 
populists.  This not only weakened the support for populists, but also emboldened their political 
opponents in civil society and within the institutions of government. 
The result of combined political and public opposition typically creates political deadlock 
and social upheaval that limits populist leaders’ abilities to govern and, in many Latin American 
cases, their ability to remain in power.  Ecuador, for instance, has struggled with the confluence 
of neoliberal reform and populist government, in the post-transition period of the late 1990s 
resulting in the ousting of three consecutive, democratically elected presidents (Abdalá Bucaram, 
Jamil Mahuad, and Lucio Gutiérrez) by congressional and public opposition. 
The synergy between neoliberalism and populism that was manifest in the concentration 
of power in the upper levels of the executive also faced contradictions as the process of 
neoliberalism advanced and became entrenched.  The dominance of political authority during the 
early phase of neoliberal transformation offered opportunities for populists to overcome political 
deadlock and social resistance.  However, the movement away from populism toward 
authoritarianism can generate its own pitfalls.   
By the early 1990s, the form (if not the function) of democratic government had become 
the norm across Latin America.  As such, the concentration of power by neoliberal populists was 
opposed locally, by nascent civil society organizations, and worldwide, by international 
organizations and global public opinion.  The desire for the maintenance of the democratic form 
of government created significant barriers to the overt concentration of power.  In addition, as 
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neoliberal reform entered the consolidation phase, its local technocratic proponents, in concert 
with international financial institutions, increasingly advocated the rule of law, deregulation, and, 
more generally, government’s non-interference with the market.  Such neoliberal dictates limited 
the discretion of populist leaders and clashed with their personalistic interpretations of the 
popular will.  Increasingly, “the concentrated political authority of neopopulist leaders, which 
had served so well for enacting reform, turned into a potential threat to the smooth functioning of 
the new market model.”60  
As well, the beneficial concurrence of populism and neoliberalism that can be achieved 
through economic and political clientelism can also be constrained within the context of 
neoliberal reform.  Targeted spending programs and policies, which help to build political 
support for neoliberal populists among the subaltern sectors, require a funding and administrative 
capacity within the state to ensure high visibility and impact.  Budget austerity, privatization, and 
reductions in the state bureaucracy as part of neoliberal financial and structural reform make it 
more difficult for populists to effectively manage the distribution of special benefits and 
positions for political backing.  Indeed, the micro-level redistribution undertaken by neoliberal 
populists, while potentially useful in maintaining support among specific groups, offers no 
guarantee “that it will prove effective over the long-term in reproducing a popular political 
constituency to undergird a neoliberal project.”61  Furthermore, neoliberal reform, in the initial 
stages, tends to be generally exclusionary by distributing income upward rather than downward 
to the mass of populist supporters among the poor and marginalized.62   
As a result, the inflation of societal expectations that typically forms the discourse of 
populist political campaigns clashes with the circumscribed ability of populists to meet those 
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demands to the satisfaction of their mass of supporters and international financiers.  The lower 
wages, reduced formal sector employment, and diminished legal protections for labourers that 
often emerges following neoliberal reform are not offset by the economically clientelistic 
mechanisms available to neoliberal populists: “The present situation of greater economic 
stability, yet volatile and, on average, mediocre growth has narrowed the probability distribution 
of potential outcomes.”63  While economic clientelism has proven effective as a limited 
redistributive mechanism to reinforce popular support, it is unclear if this is sufficient to 
maintain a populist government within a strongly neoliberal framework. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, using a multidimensional approach allows us to examine populists from 
the classical to neoliberal era against a consistent set of characteristics.  The use of a 
personalistic political style, heterogeneous coalition of supporters, and top-down political 
mobilization in concert with an eclectic, anti-organizational ideology and an economically 
redistributive or clientelistic set of policies form the core characteristics of this analysis.  
Moreover, this multidimensional methodology allows contemporary populist manifestations 
occurring in an environment of neoliberalism, that is referred to in the literature as neopopulism, 
to be understood as part of the ongoing phenomenon of populism, which has proven 
opportunistic and adaptable within this new economic framework.  The synergies outlined 
between a populist mode of politics and neoliberalism overcome their apparently antithetical 
relationship as both can benefit from the use of clientelistic methods, the concentration of 
political power, and anti-organizational or anti-institutional orientations.  However, these 
underlying affinities between populism and neoliberalism are tempered by the complex 
outcomes of the transition from import substitution industrialization to neoliberalism, the effects 
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of the consolidation of the neoliberal model, and the myriad of situational and political factors 
that can constrain neoliberal populist leaders based on their unique national settings.   
Ultimately, the affinities between populism and neoliberalism allow us to understand how 
it is possible that populism remains a viable mode of politics in Latin America in the context of 
neoliberalism and why this combination can prove significantly challenging to the viability of 
populist leaders.  In the following chapter, the multidimensional approach to populism will be 
employed to categorize Ecuador’s President Lucio Gutiérrez as a populist leader.  Additionally, 
the (in)compatibility of populism and neoliberalism will support the analysis of President 
Gutiérrez’ downfall amidst the complications and contradictions of his adherence to populism 
and neoliberalism. 
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CHAPTER THREE – LUCIO GUTIÉRREZ’ RISE TO POWER 
“The country’s privileged sectors have profiteered enough; it is time for the poor to hope 
for better days, and it is to this end that I will dedicate my efforts.”1 
 
Introduction 
In Chapter Two, the concept of populism was reviewed from various perspectives and a 
multi-dimensional approach was outlined in order to frame this chapter’s discussion of populism 
in Ecuador under President Lucio Gutiérrez.  Here the objective is to analyze Gutiérrez’ rise to 
power showing how his actions were consistent with the each component of populism.  In terms 
of organization, this chapter illustrates Gutiérrez’ successful use of populism as an electoral 
strategy by reviewing his adherence to the constituent elements of the multidimensional 
approach.  Importantly, this chapter emphasizes the significant expectations that he created in 
order to mobilize the support of Ecuador’s marginalized and impoverished subaltern sectors.  
Chapter Four will build on this analysis by exploring the factors that contributed to the rapid loss 
of this support and the eventual ousting of President Gutiérrez after less than twenty-eight 
months in office. 
Populist Rise to Power 
Ecuador’s recent socio-economic and political environment has frequently been fraught 
with crisis and, in 2002, was ripe for a populist electoral mobilization.  Typically, populism’s 
emergence is rooted in periods of economic, political, social, and cultural upheaval wherein 
“previously stable relations of representation and subordination became unsettled and dealigned, 
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and thus open to new forms of identification.”2  During the 1990s in Ecuador, the institutions of 
the state, especially the presidency, struggled for both legitimacy and stability; the 
democratically elected Presidents Abdala Bucaram (1996) and Jamil Mahuad (1998-2000) were 
ejected from office well before the end of their mandates.  Moreover, at the end of the twentieth 
century, Ecuadorians were in the midst of a severe financial crisis including a collapse of the 
banking system, a default on the external debt, and nearly 70% of citizens living below the 
poverty line.3  Within this environment of unstable political representation and economic 
hardship, Lucio Gutiérrez staged a meteoric rise to the presidency despite facing better-known 
and better funded competition from the established political parties and perennial presidential 
candidates.  Gutiérrez’ political strategy conformed closely to the multidimensional approach to 
populism established in Chapter Two, which included the following components: (1) a 
personalistic mode of leadership, (2) a heterogeneous political coalition based in the subaltern 
sectors, (3) a top-down political mobilization, (4) an eclectic, anti-establishment ideology, and 
(5) an economically redistributive or clientelistic approach.4  With these characteristic elements 
of populism in mind, it is possible to trace Gutiérrez’ successful use of populism to capture 
Ecuador’s presidency in 2002. 
Gutiérrez’ electoral success was, in part, rooted in the context of the preceding crisis that 
developed during Jamil Mahuad’s short-lived presidency, which created the opportunity for 
Gutiérrez to utilize a populist strategy to take power.  In the final years of the 1990s, Ecuador 
faced one of the worst financial crises in the nation’s history resulting from the culmination of a 
banking system collapse, a default on external debt, natural disasters related to the El Niño 
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weather phenomenon, and a significant decline in the price of oil, the nation’s major export.  
Most significant among these crises, the banking system collapse initiated the political downfall 
of then-President Mahuad’s government.  
Between 1998 and 2000, Mahuad presided over a massive fiscal catastrophe centered on 
the banking industry that resulted from widespread mismanagement and corruption throughout 
the sector.  This crisis led to the failure of the nation’s largest financial institution and sixteen of 
the nation’s forty-two banks.5  In order to stabilize the banking sector, the government 
transferred six billion dollars, roughly 23% of the GNP, to the banks in the form of bailouts.6  
This transfer is estimated to represent the combined amount that was spent on education in the 
preceding thirteen years, health care in the last thirty-nine years, and agricultural development in 
the last forty-two years.7  The economic fallout from this crisis decreased the GNP by 7.3%, 
foreign investment by 34.7%, imports by 38.4%, and the value of the Sucre, the national 
currency, plummeted by 362% against the dollar.8  
Not only were Ecuadorians facing the erosion of the nation’s financial structure, they 
were also detrimentally affected by the neoliberal policies, especially fiscal austerity measures, 
implemented to manage the crisis.  Already among the poorest nations in the hemisphere, with 
high income inequality and informal sector employment, Ecuadorians were further burdened 
with the consequent decreases in social spending stemming from the government’s austerity 
policies.  Faced with a national economic crisis and pressure from international lenders for 
economic stability, President Mahuad initiated the replacement of the Ecuadorian Sucre with the 
U.S. dollar.  His dollarization policy launched widespread protests lead by the Confederation of 
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Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE - Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del 
Ecuador), Ecuador’s powerful indigenous movement.   
The dollarization policy would provide the means for currency stabilization; however, it 
adversely affected the poor, especially rural indigenous peoples and savings-dependent seniors, 
while leaving the rich, who held many of their assets in dollar investments, largely untouched.9  
This policy reinforced the Mahuad government’s determination to take steps to ensure economic 
stability with an apparently limited regard for the immediate impact on the majority of 
Ecuadorians.  As would be expected, this economic crisis and neoliberal adjustment strategy 
initiated a concurrent political crisis, which further eroded public trust in the institutions and 
individuals responsible for political representation.  In fact, polling during this period showed 
that 91% of Ecuadorians disapproved of his handling of national affairs and 53% felt the 
president should be removed from office.10  Mahuad’s dollarization policy would prove to be 
fatal to his embattled administration that also faced corruption allegations and intensifying 
protests in the nation’s capital.   
Within this volatile context, Colonel Lucio Gutiérrez, a critic of the Mahuad 
government,11 entered Ecuador’s national political scene as a leading member of a short-lived 
coup d’état.12  His actions during this coup would later form the foundation of his populist image 
and appeal to Ecuadorians during the 2002 election campaign.  As a colonel in the Ecuadorian 
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army, Gutiérrez was given the responsibility of protecting Quito’s government buildings while 
thousands of students, unionists, and indigenous protestors rallied against the Mahuad 
government.  When ordered to suppress the protestors on January 21, 2000, Gutiérrez and four 
hundred junior officers chose instead to side with them, allowing the takeover of the Congress 
buildings and Gutiérrez’ temporary installation as one of the leaders in a military-indigenous 
governing triumvirate of “national salvation.”  Faced with international calls for the continuation 
of constitutional democracy from the Organization of American States and the United States, 
among others, and failing to secure high-level support within the Ecuadorian military, this 
government lasted only a few hours.13  The ruling triumvirate was peacefully removed and 
replaced by Vice-President Noboa,14 who was symbolically sworn in from the offices of the 
Ministry of Defense.  Gutiérrez was imprisoned for six-months for his role in the coup, but, as is 
discussed in more detail later, he would then launch a successful bid for the presidency despite 
his limited political experience and relative obscurity.  Many political observers felt Colonel 
Gutiérrez had very little chance of success, however they did not take into account the potency of 
the populist strategy he would employ. 
The continuation of constitutional democracy under President Noboa held Ecuador’s 
fragile political system together, but was unable to rectify the outstanding issues created by 
dollarization and economic hardship.  Noboa’s status as a caretaker president in advance of the 
2002 presidential election saw the continuation of the Mahuad government’s economic policies, 
including dollarization, and an ongoing failure to satisfy the public’s demands for economic 
relief.  During this period, widespread protests continued and Noboa’s weak government was 
                                                
13 Liisa North, “Obstacles to Social Reform Patterns of Domination and Financial Crisis in Ecuador,” in Politics in 
the Andes: Tradition, Violence and Reform (tentative title), ed. Philip Mauceri and Jo-Marie Burt, (forthcoming), 4; 
Gerlach, 188-90. 
14 Alvaro Noboa, presidential candidate and banana magnate, is not to be confused with and is not related to then-
Vice-President Gustavo Noboa, who became President following the 2000 Mahuad coup. 
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often forced to capitulate to the demands of various entrenched interests, including the 
indigenous movement, unions, and liberation theology adherents in the Catholic Church.15  
Understandably, Ecuadorians’ trust and faith in the institutions of democracy was weak given the 
frequent recurrence of economic crises and deep political turmoil.  In 1999, polling data reflected 
widespread pessimism in the political life of the nation: only 6% of the population supported 
political parties, 11% had faith in Congress, and only 28% believed democracy could solve their 
problems.16  Additionally, a nation-wide survey ranking various institutions on a scale of one 
(low) to one hundred (high) found that democracy, the government, the justice system, congress, 
and political parties scored below fifteen.17  Such low support for Ecuador’s political institutions 
reflected their limited ability to address public demands and offer opportunities for political self-
expression.  Capitalizing on this political dissatisfaction, Gutiérrez successfully campaigned for 
the presidency by employing a populist strategy consistent with the five components of the 
multidimensional approach to populism outlined in Chapter Two.  Each of these components will 
be discussed below to show that Gutiérrez’ political strategy is decidedly populist. 
Personalistic Leadership 
The first fundamental component of populism that adherents utilize is a personalistic 
style of leadership as seen in Gutiérrez’ strategy of  appealing  to the electorate based on his 
persona.  Roberts argues that “although populist leaders may build parties or otherwise organize 
their followers, their political support is a function of personal attributes more than 
organizational loyalties.”18  Gutiérrez capitalized on his personal story and made his leadership a 
reflection of the interests of the average Ecuadorian. As one Ecuadorian declared, “he was born 
                                                
15 For more on these social movements see North, “Obstacles to Social Reform.” 
16 Lucero, 60. 
17 Lucero, 64. 
18 Roberts, “Populism and Democracy,” 6. 
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of humble origins, and I am also from humble origins … I trusted Gutiérrez.”19  In order to gain 
the confidence of indigenous and mestizo voters, who make up a large proportion of the 
population, Gutiérrez drew attention to his own modest background, mestizo heritage, and 
childhood spent in Ecuador’s predominately indigenous Amazon provinces.20  
Moreover, Gutiérrez emphasized his military affiliation, which capitalized on the 
Ecuadorian military’s relatively respected institutional position and history of social 
development in the 1970s.  He campaigned throughout the country in his military fatigues calling 
attention to his rank of Colonel and his long career of military service. 21  His connection to the 
military also offered him an opportunity to remind voters of his “patriotic sacrifice” for the 
nation during the Mahuad coup.  His previous actions were symbolic of his capacity and 
intention to stand-up for marginalized Ecuadorians in the face of a seemingly corrupt and 
uncaring neoliberal government.  Gutiérrez’ military persona combined with his involvement in 
the coup built upon his broad appeal to “the Church, the communications media, businessmen 
and bankers, and other opinion leaders, workers, women and men” to provide “ideas to change 
the country.”22  Though such statements by Gutiérrez were vague and insubstantial, they 
represented his attempt to garner appeal among a cross-section of Ecuadorians and situate 
himself as a national saviour.  In addition, the six months the Colonel spent in a military prison 
following the failed coup lent him a certain degree of legitimacy and gained him some measure 
of reverence as he was seen as someone willing to make personal sacrifices for the oppressed.  
More than any other element, the role Gutiérrez played in the 2000 presidential coup allowed 
                                                
19 Reel, A13. 
20 Roberto Ortiz de Zárate, “Lucio Gutiérrez Borbúa,” Biografías de Lideres Políticos, Centro de Investigación de 
Relaciones Internacionales y Desarrollo, 28 November 2007, <http://www.cidob.org/es/documentacion/ 
biografias_lideres_politicos/america_del_sur/ecuador/lucio_gutierrez_borbua>. [Retrieval Date 05 October 2008]. 
21 Similarly, his running mate, Alfredo Palacio, a former health minister and physician campaigned in his scrubs to 
capitalize on his link to the medical profession. 
22 Lucio Gutiérrez, quoted in North, 3. 
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him to pursue a populist strategy utilizing the personalistic leadership component of the 
multidimensional approach to establish himself as a champion of the people. 
Heterogeneous Coalition of Support 
The cultivation of supporters among a cross-section of society and, especially within the 
subaltern sectors, is the second fundamental component of the populist approach and was key to 
Gutiérrez’ electoral success.  His actions on behalf of the largely indigenous protestors during 
the Mahuad coup were an important catalyst for the development of his coalition of supporters 
among Ecuador’s subaltern sectors.  Most significantly, in June 2002, he was able to negotiate a 
programmatic and legislative alliance with the Pachakutik Party (Movimiento de Unidad 
Plurinacional Patchakutik-Nuevo País), the political wing of CONAIE, to engage the indigenous 
movement in his campaign.  This coalition allowed Gutiérrez to expand his political mobilization 
among indigenous communities and avoid direct competition with an indigenous candidate. As 
well, this coalition represented the first time the autonomous indigenous movement had allied 
itself with a non-indigenous presidential candidate, thus establishing Gutiérrez symbolically at 
the head of Ecuador’s most powerful and organized social movement.   
The agreement between Gutiérrez and Pachakutik resulted from intense negotiations on a 
basic electoral orientation that CONAIE characterized as one in which the government would 
strive to achieve “the defense of national sovereignty, of natural resources, the reactivation of the 
economy with an eye towards equity, and a commitment to peace.”23  With this coalition in 
place, Gutiérrez enhanced and further legitimized his popular image as an ally of the subaltern 
sectors and captured a dense organizational structure through which he could mobilize electoral 
support among these constituencies.   
                                                
23 Leonidas Iza, Humberto Cholango, and José Quenamá, “Indigenous Movement Breaks with President Lucio 
Gutiérrez,” Pueblos En Camino: Weaving Autonomies, 06 August 2003, <http://www.en-camino.org/node/13>. 
[Retrieval Date July 2006]. 
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Additionally, this alliance with the indigenous movement afforded Gutiérrez the 
opportunity to strengthen his appearance as a socially progressive candidate committed to the 
indigenous movement’s campaign for a more inclusive, equitable, and just nation.  His support 
for and from Ecuador’s indigenous movement also allowed him to appropriate some of the 
widespread “ambivalent sympathy”24 for the indigenous movement among a majority of non-
indigenous Ecuadorians.  Furthermore, Gutiérrez’ support from the politically left-of-centre 
indigenous movement aided in attracting supporters from among Ecuador’s political left, which 
facilitated his development of a more heterogeneous coalition of support.  Leftist political 
parties, including the Ecuadorian Communist Party, the Movement for Popular Democracy, the 
Communist Marxist-Leninist Party of Ecuador, and the Socialist party, initially supported 
Gutiérrez in his presidential bid,25 and the Labour and Democracy Movement (MTD –
Movimiento Trabajo y Democracia), which represented an “urban-based leftist political 
grouping,” created an umbrella group that allowed these groups to coordinate efforts.26  
Gutiérrez’ professed left-of-centre political orientation, discussed in detail in the ideology section 
of this chapter, played an important role in motivating this support and, when considered in 
addition to his affiliation with the indigenous movement, helped to consolidate his left-of-centre 
political support. 
Top-Down Political Mobilization   
 The third component of the multidimensional populist approach is the mobilization of 
support from the top down.  In this regard, Gutiérrez founded his own political movement called 
the Patriotic Society Party of January 21 (PSP - Partido Sociedad Patriótica 21 de Enero) to 
                                                
24 North, 3. 
25 Sundaram, “Lucio Gutiérrez: A ‘Revolution’ that Never Was,” Liberation Central Organ of the Communist Party 
of India, February 2004, <http://www.cpiml.org/liberation/year_2004/febraury/Ecuador.htm>.  [Retrieval Date 
August 2009]. 
26 Petras and Veltmeyer, 149. 
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reflect its leader’s personalistic orientation by evoking Gutiérrez’ important role in the January 
21, 2000 Mahuad coup.  Moreover, the party provided a basic electoral organization that allowed 
for the incorporation of various sectors into Gutiérrez’ political coalition and would offer a 
grouping of supporters in the congress to serve his presidential agenda.  Through the PSP, 
Gutiérrez implemented a vertical mobilization of supporters that had the appearance of 
grassroots development, but actually reflected his simultaneous disdain for working with existing 
political organizations and his desire for an electoral vehicle that would allow him to pursue his 
interests and coordinate supporters.   
The PSP offered Gutiérrez the opportunity to incorporate close military and familial 
connections within the party to support his candidacy in much the same way as he would later 
use the presidency to reward former military associates, family members, and coup plotters with 
key government posts.27  Petras and Veltmeyer note that the PSP was little more than an 
instrument to incorporate the military officers who supported the Mahuad coup into Ecuadorian 
politics and later introduce retired police and armed forces members into the party.28  Moreover, 
the party included “several wealthy ex-military business operators, and groups of petit-bourgeois 
‘professionals’” that gave Gutiérrez’ political coalition a broader reach and, in line with the 
populist model, a more heterogeneous base of support.29  
                                                
27 Former military officers who joined Gutiérrez during the Mahuad coup played important roles in the PSP and 
would later be appointed to key government posts once Gutiérrez became president.  Examples of these military 
connections include former Colonels: Patricio Acosta, who was named Secretary-General to the President, and 
Patricio Ortiz, who was appointed Minister of Social Welfare.  As well, Gutiérrez’s wife, Dr. Ximena Bohorquez, 
and his brother, Gilmar Gutiérrez, were key party organizers and ran successfully as candidates for congress under 
the PSP banner.  For a detailed account of Gutiérrez’s use of nepotism as president see Ortiz de Zárate, “Lucio 
Gutiérrez Borbúa” or Fredy Rivera Velez and Franklin Ramirez Gallegos, “Ecuador: Democracy and Economy in 
Crisis,” in Andes in Focus: Security, Democracy, and Economic Reform, eds. Russell Crandal, Guadalupe Paz, and 
Riordan Roett, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 136. 
28 Petras and Veltmeyer, 154. 
29 Petras and Veltmeyer, 154. 
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This hierarchical mobilization through the PSP was also essential to the creation of a 
bond between Gutiérrez and the disillusioned, detached, and marginalized subaltern voters that 
no longer felt represented by the existing parties.  Ecuador’s typically weak, undemocratic, and 
ideologically ambiguous political parties have a history of exclusion and regional fragmentation, 
which has frequently allowed populists like Gutiérrez to step in and take power by organizing 
and appealing to these voters.  In such cases, citizens typically vote on the basis of perceived 
leadership qualities rather than partisan membership or ideological loyalty.  Given Ecuador’s 
weak party system, political organizations that should “channel and filter political ambitions” by 
regulating access to public office through their recruitment and socialization activities are unable 
to provide a counterweight to populist mobilizations.30  In Ecuador, the party system is unable to 
effectively regulate political ambitions and, as such, populist leaders tend to arise frequently 
from outside the system.  As well, they often indulge in the creation of temporary political 
vehicles organized around the leadership of individuals with personalistic followings.  As 
Roberts notes, “given the weight of personalistic authority, partisan vehicles founded by populist 
movements are inevitably instruments that serve their leaders’ interests.”31  Gutiérrez’ PSP was 
representative of such a party, organized around the leader and his elite cadre of supporters in 
order to coordinate a popular ratification of his leadership and to present the disenchanted masses 
with an alternative to those parties perceived as responsible for the preceding socio-economic 
crisis. 
Ambiguous Ideological Discourse 
 Gutiérrez also effectively utilized the fourth component of the multidimensional populist 
approach that is a strongly anti-establishment and features an ideologically vague discourse.  
                                                
30 Roberts, “Populism and Democracy,” 7. 
31 Roberts, “Grass Roots,” 17. 
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Campaigning in a crowded field of eleven presidential candidates, each reflecting the various 
political, regional, and ideological divisions that perennially mark Ecuador’s fractious politics, 
Gutiérrez distinguished himself as a political outsider and novice.  When he entered the race in 
2002, public opinion polls placed his support at a mere 7%.32  However, Gutiérrez appealed to 
disenchanted and marginalized Ecuadorians by vilifying current political leaders and their parties 
as entrenched power brokers that were complicit in the people’s suffering.  In contrast, he 
portrayed himself as an honest, idealistic, and selfless newcomer to politics whose sole interest 
was the nation’s well-being.  What he did, in essence, was to implement the well-tested populist 
tactic of exploiting popular discontent “by attacking established parties and political elites for 
their venality and incompetence, while portraying …[himself and his team] as untainted 
outsiders who incarnate popular sentiments for change.”33  
Gutiérrez’ anti-establishment appeal also rested on a personalistic and antagonistic 
discourse of allusions to his role in the Mahuad coup on the side of “the people” against the 
power-bloc represented by Ecuador’s “corrupt bankers” and political class.34  The issue of 
corruption in previous administrations, which he claimed absorbed 40% of the national budget, 
formed a significant portion of his rhetoric.35  Gutiérrez was able to glorify his coup activity 
while denigrating established candidates and the political system.  As he charged, “during the 
government of Dr. Jamil Mahuad, a series of blatantly corrupt acts were committed.  The state 
constitution was violated systematically.  Given such constant criminal acts to satisfy the 
demands of a small group of shameless bankers and business leaders, the military must defend 
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the people.”36  Additionally, Gutiérrez situated his involvement in the Mahuad coup in a broad 
context that emphasized his quest for justice in the face of political corruption: 
What happened in Ecuador is similar to what is happening in the rest of Latin America, 
caused by the neoliberal system that has been completely hurtful and prejudicial to the 
interests of every one of our countries.  Enemy number one of democracy is not the 
military, the social movements, or the people.  Enemy number one is corrupt politicians, 
those who destabilize our country.  They are ungovernable, not the people…. I think that 
very few countries in the world would support what the Ecuadorean people have 
supported, so much injustice.37 
 
Additionally, Gutiérrez’ campaign slogan, Un Presidente Para Todos (A President for 
Everyone), aptly captures his attempt to establish a direct link with a broad cross-section of 
society and to create a contrast between himself and the denigrated political class.  This tactic 
reinforced his image as an untainted outsider who helped end the apparent corruption of the 
Mahuad government.  At the same time, it exploited what Lobsang Espinosa describes as a 
natural tendency of voters to recall the negative and accept a simple direct message: “they are 
bad, I am the solution, vote for me.”38   
Adding to his anti-establishment rhetoric, Gutiérrez was vague and inconsistent on both 
his ideology and policy.  As Petras and Veltmeyer explain: “Gutiérrez’ political discourse over 
the course of his electoral campaign was not anchored in any specific ideology or programmatic 
plan for governing the country.  It had no ideological consistency or coherence and it shifted 
with the changing winds of political opportunism.”39  This lack of specificity, while effective in 
making a broad popular appeal during the electoral contest, would be especially detrimental for 
Gutiérrez as he became defined by the public’s perceptions of what he would stand for as 
                                                
36 Lucio Gutiérrez, interviewed by Phillip Babich, “A Popular Uprising: A Look at Ecuador’s Coup,” Making 
Contact, National Radio Project, 17 May 2000, <http://www.radioproject.org/transcript/2000/0020.html>.  
[Retrieval Date May 2007]. 
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president.  In fact Gutiérrez asserted, “I do not define myself ideologically, and I am not a 
populist, but rather popular.”40  Indeed, much of Gutiérrez’ campaign rested on a popular 
“political imaginary”41 that fostered, as Gutiérrez said, “hope for better days” and the struggle of 
average Ecuadorians over political and economic realities.42     
The inferences garnered from his alliance with the indigenous movement, support from 
Ecuador’s political left, and vague declarations for political change, poverty reduction, and a 
“new” economic model for Ecuador situated Gutiérrez on the ideological left.  His leftist 
credentials, originating with his involvement in the Mahuad coup, were reinforced by reports that 
hailed him as “a champion of the poor, the indigenous people and as a crusader against neo-
liberal economic policies and US imperialism.”43  Yet, Gutiérrez’ campaign platform rested on 
the achievement of an ideologically ambiguous set of “five securities”: social, citizen, judicial, 
environmental and food, and employment security, that were to be achieved through increased 
competitiveness.44  His commitment to these policy goals, exemplified by vague and largely 
meaningless statements, did little to clarify his ideological orientation.  He described himself 
thus: “I'm a pragmatic person and my only ideology is my people, and I'm happy to have the 
support of grassroots movements.”45  
During the initial portion of Gutiérrez’ presidential campaign, he affirmed that the PSP’s 
policy blueprint supported the rejection of “neoliberal globalization or any form of external 
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intervention of international groups or foreign powers.”46  Moreover, he strengthened his left-of-
centre credentials with promises to take action to decrease foreign debt payments, oppose the 
privatization of public enterprises, isolate Ecuador from the Free Trade Area of the Americas 
(FTAA), and, generally, avoid neo-liberal measures.47  He called for an end to American military 
and economic influence in the country by proposing the abandonment of Ecuador’s dollarization 
policy and the removal of the U.S. military’s unpopular counter-drug installation located at the 
Eloy Alfaro Airbase in Manta, Ecuador.  Similarly, he called for popular democratic reforms to 
tackle the politicization of the judiciary; he committed to restructure party representation in 
congress; and he advocated transparency, efficiency, and accountability in public institutions.  
Redistributive and Clientelistic Approach  
Gutiérrez utilized the fifth, and final, element of the multidimensional populist approach, 
which is the creation of popular support through the promise of economic redistribution and/or 
clientelistic benefits once the leader is elected.  Accordingly, his ideological and policy rhetoric 
suggested that his government would offer voters direct economic benefits.  For instance, 
Gutiérrez infused his eclectic platform with popular assertions that promised economic relief 
through the redistribution of national wealth from, what he would call, the profiteering and 
privileged oligarchy to the subaltern sectors.  During the campaign, these assertions were an 
effective means of appealing to a large cross-section of supporters.   
Typically, Gutiérrez limited his economic proposals to vague generalizations that 
conformed to both the redistributive methods of populism’s classical era and to the clientelistic 
strategies of the neoliberal era.  He promoted macro-level redistribution schemes, akin to those 
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used in the classic era of populism.  To gain class-based support from indigenous peoples and the 
poor, Gutiérrez pledged not to raise taxes, continue food and fuel subsidies, take measures to 
alleviate poverty, and to restore social welfare spending. 48  Likewise, he used contemporary 
micro-level populist strategies of clientelism to target supporters by proposing to exchange 
benefits for political support.  For example, during the campaign he frequently made pledges to 
help Ecuador’s rural population, which is largely indigenous and centered in the Andean 
highlands and Amazonian regions where Gutiérrez would later capture an overwhelming 
majority of his electoral support.49  Moreover, it was from the rural indigenous population, 
particularly Protestant indigenous communities, that Gutiérrez’ PSP recruited and networked as a 
means of bypassing, co-opting, and undermining CONAIE’s rural support networks.50  As one 
young indigenous man explained, he supported Gutiérrez because he was a “small-town man 
who became a national leader” and “the majority of the past presidents of Ecuador only did 
things for the cities, not for the rural areas, [but Gutiérrez] did almost nothing for the cities and 
worked in the small towns.”51   
On the whole, Gutiérrez’ economic intimations prominently featured a rhetorical 
discourse that was meant to appeal to his left-of-centre political allies and the subaltern sectors.  
For instance, he called for limiting the privatization of state entities in the electricity, oil, and 
telecommunications industries that his supporters viewed as vital social services and national 
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resources.52  In fact, Gutiérrez made explicit declarations against privatization saying that “it 
would be very bad for a poor nation like Ecuador, if in a couple of years we find ourselves 
without public utilities and just as poor…all we have in terms of wealth is public utilities.”53  
Statements such as these were well received by his left-of-centre allies and were useful in 
securing their support on election day. 
Ultimately, Gutiérrez capitalized on the widespread economic dislocation experienced by 
Ecuadorians under the preceding administrations by exhorting the people to trust in his ability to 
find a new and better economic strategy.  With the endorsement of CONAIE/Pachakutik, 
Gutiérrez’ economic credentials were ratified and he was able to legitimize his populist appeal 
and gain a diversity of supporters. 
Gutiérrez Obfuscates His Populist Message 
In the Ecuadorian presidential system, the winning candidate must secure over 40% of 
the vote and have at least a 10% lead over his/her nearest rival on the first ballot to avoid a run-
off ballot between the top two contenders.  During the first round of voting in Ecuador’s 2002 
campaign eleven candidates competed for the country’s presidency, each reflecting the various 
political, regional, and ideological divisions that perennially plague Ecuador’s elections.  Given 
this fragmentation, Gutiérrez received only 20% of the votes and was unable to avoid a second 
ballot in November against his closest competitor, Alvaro Noboa, a multimillionaire banana 
magnate and Ecuador’s richest man, who received 17% of the vote.  Both candidates utilized 
populist political strategies during the campaign, but captured only a minority of the total votes 
in the compulsory voting system.  This outcome underscored the considerable desire among 
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some Ecuadorians, especially the subaltern sectors, for a change from the status quo that is often 
cited as a causal factor in the rise of populists.  However, it also indicated a majority of the 
population was not yet convinced by these political outsiders. 
In the run-off campaign, Gutiérrez began to consolidate his support among left-of-centre 
parties and the indigenous movement as they rallied against the more overtly neoliberal policy 
solutions advocated by Noboa.54  However, Gutiérrez also began to moderate his rhetoric and to 
adopt a stance less critical of neoliberalism, which represented a significant shift in his discourse 
and would soon lead to the erosion of the political image that he had created for himself during 
the early campaign.  Nevertheless, given the success of his populist mobilization, Gutiérrez’ true 
political intentions would not be fully understood before he was able to capture the presidency in 
the second round of the vote.  He, therefore, continued to utilize a populist strategy in order to 
maintain his base of supporters, though he obfuscated his left-of-centre message in an attempt to 
garner broader support domestically and assuage fears internationally.   
There are several examples of Gutiérrez’ shift in tactics and image during the second 
ballot campaign.  For instance, while continuing to rely on allusions to his personal history and 
military background, he no longer campaigned in military garb, but instead wore business suits.  
This alteration of his image corresponded with attacks from his competitor, who claimed that 
Gutiérrez would “become a dictator and give you bullets, bullets, and bullets.”55  It was also, in 
part, an attempt to distance himself from frequent comparisons by Noboa to fellow military man 
and populist President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela.  Importantly too, these shifts countered 
growing concerns, especially in the United States and amongst Ecuador’s elite, of a Latin 
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American “shift to the left” following President Luiz ‘Lula’ Inacio da Silva’s election in Brazil.  
Gutiérrez even traveled to the United States to meet with financial analysts on Wall Street and 
with the International Monetary Fund to re-assure them that he was not of the same mold as Lula 
or Chavez.  He noted:  
this trip [to the United States] has served to quash fears and false rumors intended to 
harm me. …[W]hat happened in Venezuela will not occur [in Ecuador] because the basis 
of my platform is government by consensus, so that together with the productive sector – 
that is, honest bankers and businessmen – we can propel the country forward.56 
Such appeals were a clear indication of his adherence to populism through ongoing attempts to 
create a heterogeneous, multi-class coalition of supporters both within the subaltern sectors and 
with significant elements of Ecuador’s powerful corporate elite.   
Gutiérrez’ populist discourse retained an intense focus on his opposition to corruption 
within the country and on Ecuador’s disillusionment with it’s political class and oligarchy, with 
which Noboa was associated.  He stated, “the main enemy of democracies, especially in Latin 
America and also around the world, is corruption.  Corruption is the main enemy.”57  By 
emphasizing the domestically and internationally popular struggle against corruption, Gutiérrez 
was able to soften his radical image as the “rebel colonel”58 and characterize Noboa as a right-
wing radical who would take ownership of Ecuador and use it as his own personal hacienda.59  
Ultimately, Gutiérrez’ alteration of his populist discourse to include the possibility that he 
was not fully against neoliberal reform, or entirely beholden to the demands of his left-of-centre 
allies, allowed him to expand his appeal to additional social sectors without completely 
alienating existing supporters.  In so doing, he claimed: “I am standing in the political center of 
                                                
56 Lucio Gutiérrez, quoted in Vendrell, “Gutiérrez: It Would Be Suicide for Ecuador to Join FTAA.” 
57 Lucio Gutiérrez, quoted in “Ecuador and the IMF,” Inside Capital. 
58 Forero, A9. 
59 Guy Hedgecoe, “Ecuador Maverick Invents His Own Rules for Election: Some Fear That If Alvaro Noboa 
Becomes President He Could Turn the Country Into His Hacienda, But Mainstream Politicians Have a Lot to 
Answer For,” The Financial Times, 12 November 2002, 2. 
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my country because I want to unite all the Ecuadoreans…the process will be done in unity and 
harmony, looking for consensus.”60  Gutiérrez’ populist overtures to the electorate, especially the 
indigenous movement, and his nebulous message on neoliberal reform efforts allowed him to 
win the presidency with 54.7% of the votes on 24 November 2002.61  
Conclusion 
The populist political imaginary that Gutiérrez created during the early campaign 
established a predominantly left-of-centre, anti-neoliberal platform that the electorate expected 
him to implement as government policy once in power.  However, Petras and Veltmeyer note 
that Gutiérrez was a career military man with no previous connections to the Ecuadorian political 
left.  Not only did he categorically deny that the PSP was a leftist movement, but a majority of 
provincial PSP leaders were politically right-of-centre and former activists of right-wing 
parties.62  Such contradictions between his populist strategy and Ecuador’s political realities 
highlight the fundamental flaw of Gutiérrez’ use of populism to secure political power.  The 
strategic application of populism through an oppositional discourse against Ecuador’s corrupt 
oligarchy, a mobilization of a diverse cross-section of society, an intense focus on the persona of 
the leader, an indiscernible economic orientation, and an opportunistic alliance with the 
indigenous movement and leftist parties directed from above by the PSP allowed Gutiérrez to 
capture the presidency.  Nevertheless, the expectations that he created with this strategy would 
diverge sharply from the actual policies and actions his government pursued leading to the 
erosion of his support
                                                
60 Lucio Gutiérrez, quoted in Forero, A9. 
61 Saint-Upéry, 4. 
62 Petras and Veltmeyer, 153-4. 
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CHAPTER FOUR – LUCIO GUTIÉRREZ’ DOWNFALL 
“Know once and for all that in Ecuador it is Lucio Gutiérrez Borbúa who commands and 
governs and that he who governs Ecuador is a patriot, who is willing to give up his own life so 
that Ecuador may have a better future for our children.”1  
 
Introduction 
Building on the work in Chapter Three, this chapter examines Lucio Gutiérrez’ failure to 
meet the expectations generated by his populist campaign. Despite significant campaign rhetoric 
against neoliberalism, corruption, and the political status quo, Gutiérrez’ presidency is 
characterized by significant reversals on these issues. This chapter reviews Gutiérrez’ policies 
and actions, which result in his transformation from Ecuador’s populist champion to political 
pariah. The conclusion that emerges from this analysis is that although Gutiérrez maintained his 
use of a populist strategy, the contradictions between the expectations his campaign generated 
and his actual policies and practices overwhelmed his hold on power in the politically volatile 
Andean nation. 
Contradictions Within Gutiérrez’ Populist Strategy 
President Gutiérrez’ downfall can be understood in terms of specific contradictions 
between his populist campaign and his actions as president.  These contradictions involve: (1) 
the alienation of his supporters through neoliberal policies and actions; (2) his involvement in 
corruption scandals; and (3) his autocratic removal of the Supreme Court.  
                                                
1Lucio Gutiérrez, “Mensaje a la Nación del Señor Presidente Constitucional de la República con Motivo del Primer 
Año de Gobierno,” Discursos Presidente, Republic of Ecuador, 15 January 2004. 
<http://www.lib.utexas.edu/benson/lagovdocs/ecuador/federal/presidente/informe.html> [Retrieval Date March 
2005].  Translation from Spanish. 
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It is important to note that despite decreasing popularity Gutiérrez maintained his use of 
populism undeterred by the obvious contradictions between his promises during the campaign 
and his actions as president. The potential compatibility of neoliberalism and populism, given 
Chapter Two’s discussion of their relationship, accounts, in part, for Gutiérrez’ continuing use of 
populism as president.  However, by analyzing the contradictions within his multidimensional 
populist approach we can come to understand Gutiérrez as an unsuccessful populist and avoid 
the pitfalls of oversimplifying and mislabeling him as a populist campaigner who became a 
neoliberal president. 
The Struggle Between Campaign Promises and Neoliberal Policy 
The first contradiction between Gutiérrez’ campaign and presidency resulted from his 
about-face on neoliberalism.  During the campaign he was successful in mobilizing supporters, 
in part, by creating the impression that his government would implement the policies and 
programs that were advocated by his leftist, indigenous, and marginalized supporters.  
Nevertheless, upon taking office Gutiérrez’ actions repudiated the public perceptions he had 
generated through his political alliances.  The alliance Gutiérrez crafted with 
Pachakutik/CONAIE and Ecuador’s political left was an essential element of his populist 
strategy during the electoral process and had the potential to provide a strong base of support for 
his coming presidency.  Moreover, this political alliance represented the potential for the 
achievement of the popular aims Gutiérrez professed during his campaign and could be 
interpreted as an extension of the general aims sought during the 2000 overthrow of the Mahuad 
government.2  However, the coalition between Pachakutik and Gutiérrez remained largely 
                                                
2 For further discussion of the nature of the link between the 2000 coup against Mahuad and the election of 
Gutiérrez in 2002 see Petras and Veltmeyer, 150-2.  
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undefined even after his win.3  Neither Pachakutik nor any other group that had endorsed 
Gutiérrez provided the candidate with a concrete plan to tackle Ecuador’s political and economic 
crisis.  In exchange for their support, which was founded on “value pronouncements and general 
expectations,”4 these allied groups expected positions of influence in the government.5  But, 
while President-elect Gutiérrez selected his cabinet from an inner circle of military and banking 
associates with links to the business sector and IMF, his allies were offered positions that 
appeared to signal a de-emphasis of the political left and indigenous movement within the 
government.6  
Pachakutik members were selected for the cabinet portfolios of Agriculture, Education, 
Tourism, and Foreign Affairs while the Environment Ministry was assigned to the coalition’s 
leftist partner, the Democratic Popular Movement (MPD - Movimiento Popular Democrático).  
The symbolic significance of the appointment of Foreign Minister Nina Pacari, a prominent 
indigenous activist, politician, and first Amerindian woman to hold such a position, was 
overshadowed by the lack of decision-making power these portfolios entailed and the constraints 
imposed on ministers by the government’s increasingly neoliberal policy orientation.7  As Rivera 
and Ramirez note, “the formation of Gutiérrez’ cabinet left the indigenous movement with a 
clearly secondary role, immediately upsetting the stability of his alliance.”8  The PSP-Pachakutik 
alliance, established on a tenuous basis and for the purpose of electoral success, appeared to have 
little resonance or constitutive power within the new government.  This reinforced the top-down, 
personalistic nature of Gutiérrez’ populist strategy and his intention to use an initial popular 
                                                
3 Rivera and Ramirez, 137. 
4 Petras and Veltmeyer, 156. 
5 As such, the populist coalition arranged by Gutiérrez could be interpreted as a clientalistic exchange among 
political elites that had a limited connection to the popular aims advanced by Gutiérrez’ populist coalition. 
6 Zamosc, 14. 
7 Petras and Veltmeyer, 157. 
8 Rivera and Ramirez, 137. 
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endorsement to run the government unrestrained by one-time allies.  In a typically populist 
fashion, Gutiérrez showed a preference for support through the ballot box and the occasional 
public mobilization, but not through active democratic citizenship. 
The assignment of the prominent Economy portfolio to Mauricio Pozo, a well-known 
banker and proponent of neoliberal reform, was further evidence of a shift in the political 
orientation of the government and a change in the indigenous movement’s status within it.  
Strategically important government positions were given to “monetarists and neoliberals”9 and 
Gutiérrez, while visiting the United States, was endorsed by President Bush as “the best ally and 
friend of the U.S.” 10  These actions raised serious doubts about how he would maintain the 
popular anti-neoliberal positions he had previously advanced while at the same time moving 
closer to neoliberal Washington.  Paradoxically, Gutiérrez also declared he would maintain the 
previous government’s dollarization policy despite strong opposition by CONAIE and despite 
dollarization being the impetus for the coup that brought Gutiérrez to national attention.  
Notwithstanding these contradictions, when Gutiérrez’ inauguration took place in January 2003, 
CONAIE declared: “This is a historic day.  We have been excluded for a long time and we now 
have hope for change; and not only for the indigenous sector but for all sectors that are 
dispossessed and neglected and have been deceived by various administrations.”11  Yet, this 
hopeful sentiment expressed by the indigenous movement became increasingly tempered by the 
growing realization that Gutiérrez’ populist campaign strategy had obscured serious 
contradictions.   
                                                
9 Petras and Veltmeyer, 157. 
10 George W. Bush, quoted in Bill Vann, “Ecuador: Drug Scandal Rocks Gutiérrez Government,” World Socialist 
Web Site, The International Committee of the Fourth International (ICFI), 06 December 2003, 
<http://www.wsws.org/articles/2003/dec2003/ecua-d06.shtml>.  [Retrieval Date June 2005]. 
11 “President of Indian Confederation CONAIE Welcomes Gutiérrez’s Victory,” Asia Africa Intelligence Wire, 25 
November 2002, Gale, University of Saskatchewan, <http://find.galegroup.com.cyber.usask.ca/ 
gtx/start.do?prodId=GRGM>. [Retrieval Date August 2009]. 
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The weakening of Gutiérrez’ alliance with the Pachakutik party and left-of-centre allies 
even before he officially took office represented a serious setback for the stability and legitimacy 
of his presidency and emphasized the reversal of his campaign promises.  While the indigenous 
movement chose initially to maintain their support for Gutiérrez, it was contingent on a 
reiteration of fundamental campaign priorities.  These priorities included a commitment to 
increasing productivity, fighting corruption, supporting increased education and social spending, 
rejecting the FTAA and other interests associated with Washington, and a moratorium on IMF 
negotiations.12 
However, in a further move that directly conflicted with the indigenous movement’s 
priorities and his populist rhetoric, Gutiérrez announced plans to secure an accord with the IMF 
to gain access to international financing and avert a default on Ecuador’s 11.4 billion USD of 
external debt.13  Having taken office with an estimated 722 million USD of budget arrears that 
represented salaries owed to the public sector (specifically the armed forces, teachers, and health 
care workers), Gutiérrez possessed few options to address the country’s economic problems.14  
Reinforcing his unwillingness to be hampered by political allies, he stated, “I will be the one to 
make all the decisions on economic and foreign policy.”15  His pursuit of an IMF agreement 
represented a series of policy choices, which differed fundamentally from the anti-neoliberal 
priorities he claimed to support during the campaign.   
 The contents of Ecuador’s IMF structural adjustment package and the legislation that 
resulted, according to Petras and Veltmeyer, represented “the most orthodox expression of the 
                                                
12 Saint-Upéry, 9; Kuiz and Zepelin, 8. 
13 Nicholas Moss, “Fund Moves on Ecuador Deal,” The Financial Times, 09 January 2003, 9. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Lucio Gutiérrez, quoted in Kuiz and Zepelin, 8. 
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current of thinking that has dominated Latin America over the last two decades,”16 namely 
neoliberalism.  The IMF agreement was based on the need to avert both an impending default on 
Ecuador’s debt and the government’s cash flow problems within the public sector.  As well, the 
240 million USD standby loan negotiated with the IMF was, in characteristically neoliberal 
language, targeted at economic stabilization, sustained growth, tax reform, access to additional 
multilateral lending opportunities, and progress on addressing key social needs.17  These priority 
areas would be pursued through strict budget austerity to ensure continued debt repayment, 
public sector reforms including privatization and the encouragement of foreign administration of 
public utilities, legislation to limit corruption and improve taxation, continued dollarization, and 
unrestricted free trade.   
The agreement with the IMF violated the demands of Gutiérrez’ political allies and its 
implementation further contradicted the promises he had made during the election.  For instance, 
Gutiérrez’ pursuit of budget austerity and debt servicing clashed with his campaign commitment 
to prioritize and increase investments in health and education.18  His government’s proposal to 
the IMF allocated 35.7% of the budget to debt servicing and only 19.5% to social programming 
in the combined areas of health, education,19 housing, and welfare.20  These budget austerity 
measures were also combined with a 25% to 30% increase in the price of fuel, a broad based 
increase in income taxes,21 and a value-added tax on medicines and electricity.22  Pachakutik was 
                                                
16 Petras and Veltmeyer, 158. 
17 Mauricio Yepez Najas and Mauricio Pozo, “Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, 
and Technical Memorandum of Understanding,” Country's Policy Intentions Documents, International Monetary 
Fund, 10 February 2003, <http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/2003/ecu/01/index.htm>.  [Retrieval Date August 
2006]. 
18 Rivera and Ramirez, 137. 
19 This budget allocation actually implied a reduction in education funding compared to 2002 levels. 
20 Petras and Veltmeyer, 249. 
21 The base threshold for paying income taxes was reduced from 6,200 to 5,000 USD 
22 Nicholas Moss, “Ecuador President Launches Austerity Package,” The Financial Times, 21 January 2003,10; 
Najas and Pozo, “Letter of Intent.” 
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successful in forcing the government to maintain subsidies on domestic cooking gas that would 
have resulted in a fivefold price increase, yet, Minister Pozo stated that the issue “has been 
postponed, not forgotten.”23 
Although the contents of Gutiérrez’ populist appeal changed to reflect a more overt 
neoliberal orientation, he continued to use populist language in an attempt to maintain his 
support: “The main objective of the government,” noted Ecuador’s Letter of Intent to the IMF, 
“is to improve the living conditions of all Ecuadoreans, particularly the poor, through sustained 
growth with low inflation, improvements in the social safety net, and the provision of better 
public services.”24  On the surface, the sentiments expressed in the Letter of Intent coincided 
with Gutiérrez’ previous populist rhetoric and his mobilization strategy directed at subaltern 
supporters.  However, neoliberal policy solutions were touted as the means to achieve these 
goals.  For example, the government pursued privatization efforts called for by the IMF in order 
to achieve greater efficiency, reduce subsidies, improve Ecuador’s business climate, and attract 
more private investment.  Proposals to privatize the telecommunications (Pacifictel and 
Andinatel), electricity, and energy (Petroecuador) sectors again placed Gutiérrez at odds with his 
campaign rhetoric on the strategic importance of public utilities and their key role in the 
generation of wealth in Ecuador.25   
Gutiérrez also pursued public expenditure reductions through aggressive public service 
reforms, which included a 10% reduction in wages and staff, a two-year wage freeze, and the 
elimination of overtime allowances.26  Such actions were balanced with personalistic measures 
such as a 20% reduction in the president’s salary and a 10% reduction in the salaries of 
                                                
23 Maurico Pozo, quoted in Moss, “Ecuador President Launches Austerity Package.” 
24 Najas and Pozo, “Letter of Intent.” 
25 See in particular the quote from Gutiérrez on page 44 regarding the importance of public utilities. 
26 Najas and Pozo, “Letter of Intent.” 
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government appointees.27  Reform in the public sector pitted the president against public 
employees and their unions that Gutiérrez characterized as corrupt, overpaid, privileged, and 
abusive of their excessive powers.28  This anti-labour rhetoric, which distanced him from his 
supporters on the political left, was heightened by “a campaign against public sector workers 
with a policy of intimidation and repression” that included arrests and firings of union 
leadership.29   
Again, consistent with the compatibilities between populism and neoliberalism outlined 
in Chapter Two, Gutiérrez’ pursuit of public sector reform, through extensive purges of the 
senior levels of the bureaucracy and public companies, offered opportunities to satisfy his 
populist strategy with well-received attacks on the perceived corruption and inefficiency of the 
public sector.  These purges allowed Gutiérrez to impose greater control over the public sector 
through key appointments and advance his IMF obligations for reform.  In 2003, unions, 
community groups, left-wing organizations, teachers, and oil-workers protested Gutiérrez’ attack 
on organized labour in the public sector and the pursuit of privatization and foreign control of 
public enterprises.30  These protests, which were symptomatic of the contradictions apparent in 
Gutiérrez’ populist discourse, corresponded to a precipitous drop in his approval rating31 from 
63% in January to 49% in April 2003.32  Gutiérrez defended his actions since becoming president 
by explaining, “when I came to power I found [a] deep economic crisis … I couldn’t wait for 
more time.  So I had to change strategy, temporarily.”33  His affirmation of change in orientation 
                                                
27 Ibid. 
28 Petras and Veltmeyer, 158. 
29 Petras and Veltmeyer, 159. 
30 Guy Hedgecoe, “Ecuador May Face New Strike by Oil Workers,” The Financial Times, 11 June 2003, 9. 
31 This poll also indicated that public opposition to his administration had more than doubled since January when 
20% of those surveyed had rated Gutiérrez as doing a bad or very bad job. 
32 “Gutiérrez Losing Support in Ecuador,” Angus Reid Global Monitor, 19 April 2003, <http://www.angus-
reid.com/polls/view/125/gutirrez_losing_support_in_ecuador>.  [Retrieval Date May 2006].  
33 Lucio Gutiérrez, quoted in Rivera and Ramirez, 138. 
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reflects the inherent difficulty of balancing popular demands for social reform with Ecuador’s 
political and economic realities.  Nevertheless, this “temporary” economic strategy, which 
Gutiérrez had promised to oppose during the campaign, conformed to the pattern of neoliberal 
economic reform that had been attempted in Ecuador since President León Febres Cordero 
pursued “Andean Thatcherism” in 1984. 34   
While budget austerity and privatization efforts posed a significant probability of 
alienating supporters and breaking up Gutiérrez’ political coalition, some elements of the IMF 
agreement presented the president with opportunities to reinforce his populist strategy.  In 
particular, he was able to show strong personal leadership on his popular anti-corruption rhetoric 
through related legislation and cooperation with his allies.  The government’s first legislative 
efforts were aimed at reforming Ecuador’s customs administration with the intention of reducing 
corruption, improving revenues, and restoring business confidence.35  With the congressional 
support of his allies from the campaign, Gutiérrez’ legislation attempted to place ports and 
customs under military control, but was opposed by the congress’ largest party – the coastal, 
business-friendly, right-of-centre Partido Social Cristiano (PSC – Social Christian Party).  Faced 
with an oppositional congress, a watered down, compromise version of the bill was eventually 
passed and allowed the president to claim a small victory against corruption.   
Further anti-corruption efforts were undertaken with the creation of the Unidad Anti-
Corrupción (Anti-Corruption Unit), a new authority under Gutiérrez’ direct control.  However, 
this action faced significant criticism from the existing Comisión de Control Cívico de la 
Corrupción (CCCC – Civil Corruption Control Commission).  In attempting to capitalize on the 
                                                
34 This term is borrowed from David W. Schodt, Ecuador: An Andean Enigma, (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 
1987). 
35 “President Pushes Reform Despite Opposition,” The Economist Intelligence Unit: Country ViewsWire, 02 June 
2003, Gale, University of Saskatchewan, <http://find.galegroup.com.cyber.usask.ca/gps/start.do?prodId=IPS>.  
[Retrieval Date August 2009]. 
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potential synergies between his populist discourse and neoliberal economic policies, Gutiérrez 
faced the difficult task of satisfying his base of subaltern supporters without diverging from his 
accord with the IMF.  Appearing to tackle corruption – in a nation ranked among the most 
corrupt in the world by Transparency International – offered Gutiérrez opportunities to support 
his popular appeal. 36  Even so, achieving results in this area proved difficult and Gutiérrez’ 
efforts lacked the timely impact needed to maintain (or generate) an effective and consistent base 
of support.   
Gutiérrez Is Abandoned By Initial Supporters 
As President Gutiérrez continued to distance himself from the left-of-centre political 
orientation he had professed only months before, his political allies and supporters in the 
indigenous and leftist movements, and among individual voters, were quick to abandon him.  His 
commitment to dollarization, support for the FTAA that he had termed “suicide” during the 
campaign, privatization efforts, and austerity reforms were too contradictory to avoid a rupture 
with his populist coalition.  As Weyland explains, populist leaders appeal to the public in 
personalistic and paternalistic terms that paint them as extraordinarily capable of fixing the 
nation’s problems; however, “when the leader is perceived as having failed the people or broken 
his promises, the electorate, which often lacks firm organization under the populist model of 
government, quickly abandons the leader.”37  Within six months of his inauguration, Gutiérrez 
had plummeted in the polls and his leftist allies in the MPD, who had praised him as “a figure 
symbolic of the popular consciousness of the people in Ecuador for change,” now called for an 
                                                
36 Robin Hodess and Marie Wolkers, Report on the Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer 2004, 
(Berlin: Transparency International, 2004), <http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/ 
surveys_indices/gcb/2004>.  [Retrieval Date December 2007].  
37 Kurt Weyland, “Will Chávez Lose His Luster?,” Foreign Affairs 80.6 (2001): 76. 
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insurrection against the government for its pursuit of neoliberal reforms and abandonment of its 
agenda.38  
The indigenous movement, which had invested several decades worth of its hard won 
legitimacy, independence, and political capital in Gutiérrez’ election, could no longer overlook 
his divergence from their principles and platform.  CONAIE asserted that Gutiérrez’ government 
had “betrayed the mandate given to it by the Ecuadorian people in the last election” and it called 
on all Pachakutik members of the government to resign their posts.39  The official withdrawal of 
Pachakutik from the government involved the resignation of hundreds of officials, including 
party members in “five ministries, eight sub-secretaries, and the hundreds of positions in the 
sectional and local governments across the country.”40  The loss of his populist coalition, 
especially the official support of the indigenous movement that linked Gutiérrez directly to 
Ecuador’s subaltern sectors, was dramatic evidence of the extent of his divergence from the 
rhetoric he used during the presidential campaign. 
Gutiérrez Attempts To Mobilize New Supporters  
Given Gutiérrez’ declining popular support and the loss of many of his initial allies, he 
struggled to mobilize new groups among Ecuador’s traditional and populist political parties in 
the congress.  In an attempt to advance his agenda of reforms and meet the expectations of the 
IMF agreement amidst growing public resentment, Gutiérrez increasingly relied on ad hoc 
coalitions of support from the parties that represent la oligarquía, the political class he so 
strongly derided during the election.  These new allies included members of the PSC (Partido 
Social Cristiano) headed by former President Leon Febres Cordero, the PRIAN (Partido 
Renovador Institucional Accion Nacional) led by Alvaro Noboa, who had competed for the 
                                                
38 Sundaram, “Lucio Gutiérrez: A ‘Revolution’ that Never Was.” 
39 Iza, Cholango, and Quenamá, “Indigenous Movement Breaks with President Lucio Gutiérrez.” 
40 Petras and Veltmeyer, 159. 
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presidency against Gutiérrez, and the PRE (Partido Roldosista Ecuatoriano) controlled from 
exile by the former President Abdala Bucaram.  Although he was able to forge some 
congressional coalitions, these allies were “notoriously fickle bedfellows, and the president 
remain[ed] just one crisis away from being left alone again.”41  Furthermore, although the 
introduction of new cabinet members into the Gutiérrez administration added to the 
heterogeneous nature of the president’s political support, it also created volatility and instability 
within the executive.  The pressure to conform with the IMF agreement advanced by Economy 
Minister Pozo and the popular social spending demands coming from other ministers, 
congressional opposition, the public, and even Vice-President Palacio, left Gutiérrez with the 
unenviable task of balancing competing and very divergent demands while maintaining his 
supporters.  Gutiérrez faced the growing difficulty of garnering small victories to shore up his 
presidency amidst a volatile and self-centred group of congressional allies who made demands 
on him in exchange for their support: 
“When the hydrocarbons bill was before Congress in June, for instance, the Partido 
Roldosista Ecuatoriano (PRE) withheld its support in the hope of forcing Mr. Gutiérrez to 
find some way to allow the exiled Roldosista leader, Abdala Bucaram, back into the 
country without the risk of facing arrest and prosecution on several corruption charges 
pending in the nation's courts.  The Partido Social Cristiano (PSC), for its part, wanted 
firm guarantees that major electrical power utilities in Guayaquil and in the Guayas 
province, as well as the Pacific Coast telecommunications monopoly, would be placed 
under the control of party friends and relatives.  Alvaro Noboa, the leader of Partido 
Renovador Institucional Accion Nacional (PRIAN), demanded full control over banana 
pricing and export policies, along with increased influence on general foreign trade 
issues.” 42 
 
Gutiérrez, once the political outsider and rebel commander, had become the ultimate 
political insider and power broker. 
                                                
41 “Ecuador Politics: President Gutiérrez Regains His Footing,” The Economist Intelligence Unit: Country 
ViewsWire, 20 January 2004, <http://www.proquest.com.cyber.usask.ca/>.  [Retrieval Date August 2009]. 
42 “Ecuador politics: Congress derails government oil policy, ” Economist Intelligence Unit: Country ViewsWire, 17 
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His administration was also more routinely viewed as adversarial towards civil society 
opposition and its demands for social reform.  Popular protests, which have a strong tradition in 
Ecuador, were often matched by small, government-organized counter-demonstrations of 
presidential supporters and significant mobilizations of the Ecuadorian military.  Following its 
break with the government, the indigenous movement was regularly at the centre of these 
popular protests against Gutiérrez’ economic agenda.  As a result, indigenous activists became 
the focus of persecution.  For instance, Humberto Cholango, leader of the indigenous group 
Ecuarunari, was briefly jailed for calling Gutiérrez a liar,43 Leonidas Iza, president of CONAIE, 
was attacked in an apparent assassination attempt,44 and Lenin Cali Najera, the national youth 
leader of Pachakutik was murdered in Guayaquil.45  As well, radio and television stations critical 
of the government were frequently sent package bombs.46  While these examples of political 
violence and intimidation were, in many cases, not directly attributed to the government, they 
reflected the inherent dangers of criticizing Gutiérrez’ administration.   
In addition to political violence, the government was seen as actively co-opting the 
indigenous movement.  Following CONAIE’s initial inclusion in the government, which was 
itself labeled cooptation of the movement by some indigenous analysts,47 Gutiérrez’ 
administration attempted to take advantage of the movement’s internal divisions.  In some cases, 
local indigenous groups were engaged in clientalistic exchanges of social spending projects for 
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political support.48  Government resources and positions were also used to legitimize particular 
indigenous groups, specifically the Federación Ecuatoriana de Indígenas Evangélicos 
(Ecuadorian Federation of Evangelical Indigenous Peoples), in order to strategically demobilize 
and weaken the representativeness of the national indigenous organization, 49 CONAIE.50  Given 
ongoing corruption, heightened political violence, and mounting unpopularity, many 
commentators and former political allies speculated that Gutiérrez would soon suffer the same 
fate as Ecuador’s two previously elected presidents. 
Corruption Further Weakens Gutiérrez 
The second major contradiction plaguing Gutiérrez’ administration was between his 
popular rhetoric against corruption and his alleged misuse of public office and questionable 
practices as president.  Within months of his inauguration in January 2003, evidence of blatant 
nepotism and unscrupulous financial dealings began to surface.  The Ecuadorian media reported 
widely on Gutiérrez’ indulgence in nepotism through the appointment of military associates, 
friends, and family members to senior posts within the public service including at the state bank 
and in various diplomatic postings.  Additionally, relatives and associates received positions in 
public utilities such as the state oil company, Petroecuador, and state telecommunications 
company, Anditel.51  These appointments appeared to fit with the long-standing pattern of 
Ecuadorian politics that Gutiérrez had promised to ardently oppose.   
The president’s nepotism was highlighted by a series of scandals involving his 
appointees.  It was discovered that Nelson Álvarez, Minister of Urban Development and 
                                                
48 “Corruption Claims Hound President,” The Economist Intelligence Unit: Country ViewsWire, 07 June 2004, 
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Housing, had been twice indicted for forgery of bank documents and embezzlement and, as such, 
was forced to resign.  As well, Gutiérrez’ brother-in-law, Napoleon Villa, a former police officer 
and head of the Fondo de Solidaridad (Solidarity Fund), the government’s social welfare and 
political patronage mechanism, had been previously removed from the national police force for 
running a corruption ring and accepting bribes for promotions.52  When this information was 
made public by the media, Villa was removed from the Fondo de Solidaridad, but he remained a 
close advisor to the president and a member of his administration.  Given Gutiérrez’ strong anti-
corruption rhetoric and opposition to elite oligarquía networks, these scandals tainted his image 
as an outsider and as “A President for Everyone.” 
Further accusations of corruption that personally implicated Gutiérrez soon surfaced and 
severely challenged his integrity.  His presidential campaign was publicly accused of accepting 
30,000 USD from a former provincial governor who had been arrested for exporting half a ton of 
cocaine to Mexico.53  While Gutiérrez strongly denied accepting drug money and considered the 
accusation part of a conspiracy to discredit him, the public and his supporters were again 
alienated from his populist appeal.  Evidence continued to mount linking the president, his 
family, party officials, and members of his cabinet to the suspected drug dealer and his 
associates.  As a result, Gutiérrez’ approval rating continued its downward trend to only 18% 
support, while an additional poll showed 85% of the public did not believe his denial of 
involvement.54 
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Despite the corruption accusations against him, his family, and members of his 
administration, Gutiérrez maintained a strong anti-corruption discourse throughout his 
presidency: “I will either put an end to the corrupt oligarchy that has become rich at the cost of 
the Ecuadorian people's pain and tears, or I will die trying.”55  Such rhetoric appeared 
increasingly to be a diversionary tactic and an attempt to bolster his failing presidency.  
Moreover, his position as the head of the government’s Anti-Corruption Unit cast doubt on the 
government’s actual willingness and ability to tackle endemic corruption.  Despite Gutiérrez’ 
efforts and statements, corruption remained a damaging and reoccurring theme during his 
presidency and reduced the legitimacy of institutional attempts to combat it. 
Autocratic Removal of The Courts 
The third major contradiction between his populist campaign and presidency relates to 
Gutiérrez’ manipulation of the courts.  In late 2004, mounting opposition to President Gutiérrez 
resulted in a push for his impeachment in Congress on the grounds of corruption, specifically the 
alleged embezzlement of state funds to support his Patriotic Society Party during mid-term 
elections.  With weakened public and political support, the president faced the strong likelihood 
that the opposition parties would be able to gather the fifty-one votes out of one hundred needed 
to begin removal proceedings in the congress.  However, the president was able to engage a slim 
majority of parties, including the PRE and PRIAN, in a pro-government coalition to stop 
impeachment proceedings and advance his stagnating legislative agenda of reforms to the oil and 
electricity industries and social security.   
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This political maneuvering described as “horse-trading in appointments and promises,”56 
required the president to make considerable, and ultimately politically fatal, concessions to his 
new allies.  Most significantly, Gutiérrez supported the pro-government coalitions’ 
constitutionally illegitimate removal of members of the Constitutional Court and Supreme 
Electoral Tribunal on 24 November 2004 and the dismissal of the justices of the Supreme Court 
on 08 December 2004.  Although Gutiérrez attempted to frame the purge of the nation’s highest 
courts in terms of democratic reform and the depoliticization of the judicial system, it was widely 
perceived to be a politically expedient move that would save him from impeachment by 
replacing the court with another that was “just as partisan, only with more and different 
patrons.”57  Internationally, the reorganization of the courts, which concentrated control of all 
three branches of government in the pro-Gutiérrez coalition, was viewed as a worrisome 
movement toward authoritarian control and an attack on democratic institutions.58  The United 
Nations special rapporteur ordered to investigate the situation for the international community 
found that “the country was no longer governed by the rule of law and that the conduct of the 
Congress and the Government was propelling the country into a deepening crisis.”59   
The president responded to strong criticism from legal professionals, non-governmental 
organizations, and students by announcing his government’s intention to gain a popular 
endorsement through a referendum on institutional changes.  However, this populist mechanism 
was overshadowed by Gutiérrez’ political machinations and those of his congressional 
supporters, whose new judicial appointees cleared former Presidents Alvaro Noboa and Abdala 
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Bucaram of corruption related charges.60  Such blatant manipulation of the judicial system for 
political payoffs increased polarization and, as such, the public expressed growing disregard for 
the nation’s political institutions by calling for the president’s resignation, the replacement of the 
partisan courts, and the dismissal of Congress.61   
Public protests became increasingly common across the country, often featuring parallel 
demonstrations of government supporters and detractors.  As the scale of the anti-Gutiérrez 
protests grew and the pro-government coalition unraveled, the president indulged in strongly 
populist rhetoric.  He labeled himself a “dictocrat” who would protect the poor from the 
country’s “corrupt oligarchy” and he encouraged his supporters to take to the streets to prevent a 
coup by the traditional parties.62  A week of nationwide mass protests reached the tipping point 
on 14 April 2005 when Gutiérrez labeled protestors in Quito forajidos, Spanish for criminals or 
outlaws.  The derision became a focal point for action as protestors vented their frustrations over 
local radio and demonstrations were “spontaneously formed throughout Quito by boys, girls, 
young people, women, men, the elderly…all of whom, repeatedly insisted: ‘we are all 
forajidos.’”63  The president found himself in the same unenviable position as his predecessors 
Mahuad and Bucaram, with protests in major centres across the country, a CONAIE mobilization 
of indigenous peoples in the rural areas, and daily demonstrations in the capital city (where 
security had to be mobilized to guard government buildings against demonstrations). 
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To control the situation, Gutiérrez declared a state of emergency on 15 April 2005, which 
suspended civil rights, mobilized the armed forces, and led to violent repression and numerous 
arrests.  As well, in an attempt at appeasement, he issued an unconstitutional decree dismissing 
the new Supreme Court appointed by Congress in December, but the very next day was forced to 
withdraw the decree and negotiate with members of Congress on a process for reforming the 
courts.64  By 19 April 2005, students led a 100,000 person strong demonstration, comprising of 
individuals from all walks of life, to the Presidential Palace.  Here, protestors clashed with police 
and Gutiérrez’ paid “supporters” who had been bused in to the capital from various provinces.65  
On the following day, Gutiérrez faced the consequences of his failed populist strategy as events 
combined to end his fragile hold on power.  The chief of police resigned, protestors stormed 
Congress, and sixty-two opposition legislators of the one hundred member congress met 
elsewhere in the capital and voted to remove Gutiérrez from the presidency for rumored 
abandonment of his post.  The final blow was the military’s withdrawal of support in favour of 
Vice-President Palacio.  Gutiérrez had few options and fled into political asylum. 
Conclusion 
After barely two-years into his elected mandate, the self-styled “President for Everyone,” 
who had claimed he would “change Ecuador or die trying,”66 left the country’s highest 
institutions, and the public’s trust in government, in arguably worse condition than when he had 
taken office.  As a presidential candidate he had prophetically stated, “In Ecuador democracy has 
been reduced to elections, the candidates deceive the people with all manner of promises that 
they never fulfill.  Once the candidates get into power they forget about the people.”67  Gutiérrez’ 
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successful use of populism as an electoral strategy allowed him to make an unexpected rise to 
political power on the people’s desperate hope for change and, in so doing, he established a 
strong political imaginary with concurrent public expectations.  However, his policy reversals 
and (in)actions once in office defied those expectations, denying a voice to the politically 
frustrated and marginalized sectors with whose votes he had won the presidency.  A populist 
champion of radical change for Ecuador, Gutiérrez’ populist strategy once in office served only 
to increase institutional fragility, political polarization, and instability, all while obfuscating his 
involvement in more of the same corruption, political infighting, and IMF structural adjustments 
that sunk his predecessors.  
Returning to the multidimensional approach to populism that frames this thesis, we see 
that Gutiérrez’ rise to power conformed to and relied upon the five components of populism: (1) 
personalistic leadership, (2) a heterogeneous coalition of support, (3) top-down political 
mobilization, (4) an ambiguous ideological discourse, and (5) a redistributive and clientelistic 
economic approach.  Through populism, Gutiérrez successfully captures the presidency, which 
highlights its viability as an electoral strategy.  However, as we see from Gutiérrez’ rapid 
political downfall, populism as a governing strategy is susceptible to contradiction and failure 
when the strong political imaginary created during the campaign for president is not fulfilled.  
Gutiérrez’ inconsistencies, especially on neoliberalism and corruption, propelled him toward 
increasingly desperate political maneuverings and autocratic measures that compromised his 
hold on power.  Moreover, these contradictions damaged his integrity, which, whether perceived 
or real, was fundamental to his populist strategy and made it impossible for him to meet the 
public’s expectations.  Tracking Gutiérrez’ rise and fall using a populist framework indicates that 
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although populism is a beneficial electoral approach, this strategy can impose significant 
limitations on a government.
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CHAPTER FIVE – CONCLUSION 
While the multi-dimensional approach to populism employed in this thesis is a synthetic 
construction, built from five components common to populist manifestations, it has supported 
this paper’s objective of providing a critical analysis of the rise and fall of Lucio Gutiérrez.  The 
development of this approach in Chapter Two and its application to the Gutiérrez case in 
Chapters Three and Four have shown that populism is a viable, yet volatile, political strategy.  
Importantly, the role of expectations in the populist approach has emerged as a vital element of 
this analysis and helps to explain populism’s precariousness: 
The betrayal of expectations by a populist government, and more to the point, the 
incapacity to make good on unrealistic – even if well intended – promises of a messianic 
nature, further destroy what little trust in governments and institutions the people might 
still have.  By repeating the well-known cycles of hope and frustration, populism creates 
deeper wounds in the social fabric and increases political volatility.1  
Gutiérrez’ inability to meet the demands of his indigenous allies, stand-up for his 
purported left-of-centre values, or act on his anti-corruption rhetoric made his time in office 
untenable, which resulted in the degeneration of his support and his removal from office by a 
disenchanted public.  In the aftermath of his defeat, Ecuadorians repudiated Gutiérrez, the 
institutions of government, and politics in general.  Approval of Gutiérrez’ performance 
plummeted from 62% in 2002 to 19% following his removal in 2005 with a strong 75% 
disapproval rating.2  As well, disapproval of the National Congress’ performance was measured 
in the high eighties3 and confidence in the institution fell to single digits.4  Caretaker president, 
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Alfredo Palacio, saw a steady decline in his approval as his government attempted to reconcile 
the constitutional and political ruptures Gutiérrez created.  In fact, less than a year after 
Gutiérrez’ removal, only 19% of the public felt the ouster had improved the situation in 
Ecuador.5 
The impact of Gutiérrez’ failure to meet the expectations generated by his populist 
strategy is further highlighted in terms of Ecuador’s economic performance.  While ongoing 
economic hardship would be a plausible explanation for Gutiérrez’ short tenure in office, the 
continuation of dollarization and implementation of neoliberal policies actually resulted in 
controlled inflation, economic stability, and impressive economic growth of 3.6%, 7.9%, and 
4.7% in 2003, 2004, and 2005 respectively.6  Here the potential for neoliberalism and populism 
to thrive together is apparent – if Gutiérrez could have reconciled his neoliberal actions with his 
campaign commitments.  However, Ecuador’s macro-level economic successes through 
neoliberalism did little to provide tangible benefits like employment or social welfare schemes in 
the immediate term.  Moreover, these economic achievements failed to avert public anger or 
solidify the support of political allies because they were accomplished through a reversal of 
electoral promises.  In Gutiérrez’ case, populism proved to be a viable electoral strategy that 
enabled a little-known colonel to craft a diverse coalition of supporters and win the presidency 
on vague promises and loosely held convictions.  Yet, this same populist strategy also proved 
volatile, as Gutiérrez’ government failed to live up to the “political imaginary” that he created. 
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 A movement away from populism in Ecuador would be expected in light of the public’s 
disappointment with Gutiérrez’ inability to fulfill their expectations.  Nevertheless, an ongoing 
desire for stability and strong leadership on political reform helped Rafael Correa score a 
populist victory in the 2006 presidential election.  Considered in terms of the multi-dimensional 
approach to populism, Correa’s electoral campaign too conformed to the components of a 
populist strategy.  His personalistic leadership style blended charisma and outsider appeal with 
an insider’s knowledge that was based on his Harvard credentials and short stint as an out-
spoken finance minister under President Palacio.  His campaign skillfully referenced his last 
name (which means “belt” in Spanish) using the tag line “Dale Correa,” implying that voters can 
give the nation’s entrenched interests the lash by electing him.7  Correa also appealed directly to 
the poor and those who had lost faith in Ecuador’s institutions.  Not surprisingly, the indigenous 
movement, leftist parties, and urban and rural social movements endorsed him.  Correa promised 
fundamental institutional change through a constituent assembly tasked with rewriting the 
constitution, an end to the corruption of traditional political parties and the power of the 
oligarchy.  Additionally, to reinforce his commitment to change he ran for office with no party 
affiliation and no candidates for Congress.  Widely considered a reformer in the style of his 
friend President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, Correa promised to renegotiate oil contracts, 
increase social spending, and “bring you happiness, hope, honesty and a promise of change.”8 
Three years and two presidential elections later, President Correa appears to have 
succeeded with his populist strategy where Gutiérrez failed.  As of 2009, Correa’s constitutional 
reforms have been implemented, for the first time in 30 years no run-off vote was needed to 
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secure his second term,9 and he has taken a hard line in bargaining concessions from oil 
companies to fund his implementation of “21st-century socialism.”10  His support among 
subaltern sectors remains high, and his performance has consistently been rated above 50% since 
the beginning of his second term.11  As well, he has increased social spending by more that 50%, 
doubled capital spending on infrastructure, and provided 1.3 million poor households with a $30 
per month stipend.12  With constitutional maneuvering behind him, it remains to be seen if 
Correa will be able to avoid volatility and continue addressing, or appearing to address, the 
expectations of Ecuadorians. 
As briefly seen in Ecuador’s experience under Correa, the multi-dimensional approach to 
populism provides a framework for examination and a means for comparative analysis.  The 
articulation of populism in this thesis offers a starting point for further research including 
comparative examinations of populist experiences in Ecuador and across Latin America.  
Interesting work could be pursued by comparing the successes achieved by populists such Correa 
and Chavez or contrasting these experiences with the failure of populists like Gutiérrez.  In 
asserting that populism is both a viable and volatile political strategy this thesis advances its 
study by raising questions about the importance of the public’s expectations as a factor in a 
populist’s success or failure.  Moreover, this thesis begs further examination of populist 
manifestations to determine additional factors that influence viability or volatility including 
political history, social context, and the economic environment.  While these factors were 
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addressed here to some extent, the Ecuadorian case could be further illuminated by more 
extensive research on electoral politics and the corresponding policies and programs Gutiérrez 
attempted to implement while in government.  On the surface, Lucio Gutiérrez’ presidency 
appeared to be an unfortunate series of missteps.  However, the examination of his actions 
through populism has shown that his violation of the principles and promises that catapulted him 
to power resulted in his ejection from Ecuador’s highest office. 
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